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ABSTRACT
Development and Dynamics of US Welfare
Liza Jennifer Gordon
In this dissertation I analyze the development of contemporary US welfare policy with special
consideration given to the importance of race and gender. In the introductory chapter I outline how
the development of the American welfare state has continuously neglected the needs of women
and minorities as well as how classist, racist, and sexist appeals have been prevalent throughout
US history in relation to welfare policies. The remaining chapters analyze how contemporary
welfare policies including the 1996 welfare reforms and state drug-testing for welfare laws carry
on these American legacies. In Chapter 1 I examine how the classist, sexist, and racist messages
surrounding the 1996 welfare reform affected the welfare preferences of White and Black
respondents from 1994 to 1996 using panel data and find some evidence suggesting that Black
women became more supportive of the child cap reform from 1994 to 1996. In Chapter 2 I track
state adoptions and proposals of drug-testing laws across American states from 2009 to 2018 to
examine how racial variables affected the diffusion of drug-testing policies and find that statelevels of racial resentment significantly affect the likelihood of both adoptions and proposals.
Finally, I use a novel experimental survey design to examine the effect of marginal and nonmarginal implicit racial cues on Black preferences on drug-testing for welfare as well as novel
framing techniques to determine whether conservative support for drug-testing for welfare policies
is due to race-neutral conservative principles or racial prejudice and find some evidence suggesting
that conservatives were not primarily motivated by racial resentment.
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Introduction
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Introduction
This dissertation addresses several central questions. First, how do racialized messages
influence the populations at which those messages are targeted? Second, what makes states more
likely to adopt or propose legislation that requires applicants for welfare to pass drug-tests to be
eligible for assistance? Lastly, do race-neutral conservative values or feelings of racial prejudice
have a stronger effect on support for drug-testing for welfare policies? I attempt to answer these
questions in several ways. To examine the first question, I first analyze data from the 1990’s to
explore the potential effects of the racialized and gendered debate of welfare reforms effected
American National Election Studies (ANES) panel respondents from 1994 and 1996. Second, I
revisit the question by utilizing the marginal and non-marginal cues first suggested by White
(2007) in an experimental survey.
I also use the survey attempt to answer my third central question about the motivations
behind conservative preferences toward drug-testing policies. Finally, I use an event history
analysis design to study whether racial variables—such as the proportion of Black welfare
recipients or state-level estimates of racial resentment—make states more likely to either adopt
or propose drug-testing laws. To fully understand the contemporary welfare policies I analyze,
the 1996 welfare reforms and the more recent efforts of states to implement drug-testing
requirements, it is necessary to understand how race and gender have always played important
roles in the development of welfare policy in the United States. Throughout this dissertation, I
argue that the long-standing tradition of racialized and gendering welfare policy is far from over.
Instead, these legacies persist in the 1996 child cap policy and the two-year limit as well as the
drug-testing policies of the 2010’s.
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Creation of the Welfare System: Restrictions on the Disempowered and Disadvantaged
Efforts by policymakers to restrict eligibility for public assistance is a quintessential
American tradition (Piven and Cloward 1993). Moreover, these efforts have historically and
consistently targeted racial minorities and women—the conventionally disempowered and
disadvantaged. Feminist theorists maintain that even though a majority of social program
recipients are women, the welfare system actually exists to maintain a male dominated society
and primarily works to serve male interests (Sapiro 1990, 48; Skocpol 1992, 31). Social
programs do so by enforcing traditional gender roles for both men and women. Government
assistance in the United States has always been used as a tool to dictate and control the behavior
of those receiving benefits (Piven and Cloward 1993; Abramovitz 1996).1 The US welfare state
is built on the idea of a family wage which assumes the income of the male breadwinner is
sufficient to provide for the entire family, allowing women to stay in their “proper” place, the
home (Fraser 1994, 591-592; Pateman 1990, 241-247).
Moreover, feminist theorists suggest that even when government provides benefits to
women, it is done to indirectly serve men. As Sapiro suggests, “Social policy aimed at women
has been designed to benefit them in their capacity as wives and mothers only in a limited
sense,” (Sapiro 1990, 45). When women were granted benefits, the intent was to help women
care for their husbands and children not to assist women themselves. In other words, women
simply lived “contingent lives” and were supported only when it helped them serve in that
singular capacity (Sapiro 1990, 51).2

1

Elster (1990) explains various theories on the justification for the existence of welfare systems. One of
these justifies welfare systems as a method of social control of the lower classes by the ruling elites (58).
2
Sapiro suggests this system persisted until the passage of Title VII of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971 (Sapiro 1990, 45).
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There are also theories that rely on racial legacies to explain the development of the US
welfare system. Such theories explain that the same underdevelopment and laggard expansion of
the US welfare structure discussed by institutional theorists can be explained by historic racism
(Piven and Cloward 1993, 424). In fact, racial theories are also institutional in nature.
Compromises over the Constitution, which led to federalism and a decentralized governmental
system, were necessary due to debates over the issue of slavery (Piven and Cloward 1993, 424).
According to critical race theory (CRT) the social construct of race is used by white elites
to preserve their privilege and regulate racial progress (Limbert et al. 2005, 254). Analyses of the
welfare system from this perspective argue that welfare policies are designed to serve the
interests of white elites. Critical race feminist theory (CRF) expands the framework provided by
CRT by emphasizing the intersection of race and gender in the construction of welfare policies
designed to maintain “race, class, and gender hierarchies” (Limbert et al. 2005, 255; Orloff 1993;
Piven and Cloward 1993).
Closely tied to institutional theories of the welfare system are those that explain the
American welfare state as a product of a long enduring tradition of American liberal values,
which stress limited government and individual rights (Orloff 1988, 54; Quadagno 1994, 194).
Racial theorists argue that American adherence to such liberal values is inconsistent. Americans
have frequently accepted social programs that entailed in-depth government involvement
(Quadagno 1994, 194). Quadagno explains such exceptions to American liberal values by
defining two types of liberty—positive (liberty of individuals to act on their conscious purposes)
and negative (liberty from external restraints on first amendment rights like speech, etc.)
(Quadagno 1994, 194). Americans cited liberal values and resisted social programs only when
government involvement impeded on the negative rights of white citizens (Quadagno 1994, 194).
4

In order to limit eligibility, and as justification for policies that regulate behavior, US
policymakers have regularly framed welfare recipients as falling into two camps: deviants and
the worthy. The first class of benefits includes social insurance/social security aimed at the
“deserving”—unemployed working men, children, and the disabled (Sapiro 1990, 41; Amenta
1998, 3; Skocpol 1988, 269). The second class, the “underserving” are labeled as such due to
personal flaws that limit their ability to work, fulfill their role of mother/wife, or meet the
requirements of liberal citizenship (Sapiro 1990, 41; Amenta 1998, 3; Skocpol 1988, 296).
Members of this second class of welfare recipients are the most frequent targets of
political attacks—mostly from conservatives, though not always—based on the assumption that
welfare benefits act as disincentives to gainful employment, promote immoral behavior, and
encourage recipients to remain unproductive members of society (Skocpol 1988, 296; Amenta
1998, 3). This “undeserving” class of welfare recipients are frequently portrayed by political
elites as societal deviants.3
For the most part, the deserving and undeserving distinction has been promoted by
government actions and the reigning political ideology in the US, classical liberalism
(Hochschild, Morone 1990, Gordon 1990). Traditionally, society perceived men as the providers
and women, due to an alleged natural aptitude, as caretakers who were dependent on men
(Sapiro 1990, 42; Mink 1990, 97). Women were isolated to the private sphere—the home and socalled women’s issues (Sapiro 1990, 42; Nelson 1990, 131). The public sphere, where governing
and policymaking took place, was the dominion of men. Laws reflected this distinction between
public and private. For instance, women’s suffrage was not realized until 1920. Women who did

3

These political elites are not exclusively members of any one political party or ideological group. For
example, during the debate and passage of the 1996 welfare reforms, members of Congress on both sides
of the aisle used racial and gendered stereotypes to promote altering the welfare system.
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manage to enter the labor market were relegated to certain occupations to prevent them from
competing for a man’s job (Sapiro 1990, 44). The rightful job of a women was to stay home and
care for her husband and her children (Sapiro 1990, 44). According to Pearce (1990), the duality
of the welfare system, or the distinction between assistance for the “deserving” (working men)
and the “undeserving” (women and minorities), is foundationally discriminatory to women and
supports woman’s status in the labor market (270). Due to the emphasis on putting welfare
recipients to work, poor women, like poor men, are expected to enter the labor market despite the
various barriers to entry that are unique to women (Pearce 1990, 270). Moreover, the
employment opportunities most available to these women are low-wage and offer little job
security or benefits (Pearce 1990, 270).
Situating Women and Minorities in the Welfare State
The first policy actions of the American national government with a social welfare flavor
involved the Civil War pension program, which established aid for Union veterans, including
those who were disabled during the war, and also extended benefits to widows of those veterans
(Skocpol 1992, 1; Albiston and Nielsen 1994, 477-478). By the close of the 19th century this
“precocious welfare state” grew to cover one third of elderly men and widows, with the dispersal
of benefits dominated by a GOP controlled patronage system (Skocpol 1992, 1; Orloff 1988, 38).
The main recipients of assistance were white men, with benefits extending to women only
through the death of their husbands (Albiston and Nielson 1994, 477).
The widespread patronage behind Civil War pensions was both the reason for its initial
success and popularity, as well as for resistance to future social programs from that same
Southern contingent that had demanded protection of the “peculiar institution” of slavery (Orloff
1988, 45; Quadagno 1994, 191). Some racial theorists argue that accounts “on the war against
6

patronage abuse…neglect the war waged for democracy” (Quadagno 1994, 191). The war
against democracy, in this case, refers to the constant and persistent denial of full citizenship to
Black Americans (Quadagno 1994, 191).
It was not until the Progressive Era and the implementation of mother’s aid, that benefits
were directly extended to women, albeit male dominated workmen’s compensation programs
were much more generous. Women were only seen as worthy within their roles as mothers and
caretakers. Workmen’s compensation and mother’s aid were realizations of a gender-based
distinction in American social policy that was to shape all the programs that followed. Where
workmen’s compensation represented social insurance for the deserving class of male recipients,
mother’s aid was relief, for the quasi-deserving, women who fulfilled their proper role as
mothers as defined by various state and private authorities (Orloff 1988, 39; Nelson 1990, 124).
Mother’s aid was meant to address “erosions in motherhood wrought by work and
poverty…” and were the first publicly funded social programs apart from military and veteran
pensions (Mink 1990, 109; Sapiro 1990, 37; Skocpol 1992, 10). However, in order to receive
benefits under these programs, mothers were subject to outside observation and required to meet
a moral fitness standard (Mink 1990, 110). Fatherless families, and ones in which the mother
worked, were moved under the purview of state social programs that tended to be more
restrictive and subject to local politics (Mink 1990, 100). Mother’s aid represents what Mink
(1990) refers to as the socialization of motherhood (93). These policies represent advancements
not for women as citizens but rather as women as mothers and wives of citizens (Mink 1990, 93).
America’s historical conceptions of citizenship were both gendered and racialized by tying
citizenship and the public sphere to white manhood (Mink 1990, 93). Citizens were expected to
be independent, productive, and engage in civic activities (Mink 1990, 94).
7

However, women and minorities were not permitted to be independent (have selfownership and own property), productive (to work and be self-reliant), or engage in civic
activities (serve on juries, vote, etc.) (Mink 1990, 95). According to Pateman, women in society
are largely seen as belonging in the private sphere—operating as housekeepers and caretakers—
and thus occupy a particular space in liberal ideology in which the state should not trespass
(1990, 236). Since a women’s place is in the private sphere, women in the workforce were
outsiders, their primary duty is as mothers and wives (Pateman 1990, 244). As Pateman explains,
employment and standing as a legitimate worker serve as the basis for liberal citizenship (1990,
237). Since women’s status as workers lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many Americans,
women’s status as citizens also lacks legitimacy (Pateman 1990, 248).
Pateman (1990) identifies two pathways women have pursued to achieve legitimate
citizenship. In the first, women adapt to society’s misconceptions and stereotypes of women and
attempt to become more like their male counterparts (Pateman 1990, 252). In the second, women
remain in the private sphere and embrace so-called women’s duties. The first pathway has been
unsuccessful in achieving legitimate citizenship because women are still relied on to do the work
at home (Pateman 1990, 252). The second pathway is unsuccessful because women are confined
to the home and remain second-class citizens in eyes of society (Pateman 1990, 252). The
irreconcilability of these paths has been named the Wollstonecraft Dilemma (Pateman 1990,
250).
Hegel described women as “natural social exiles” who fail to be incorporated into society
like their male counterparts (Pateman 1990, 235). This sexual division and the identification of
two separate spheres, the public (the proper place for men) and the private (the proper place for
women), creates political problems embedded in the welfare system (Pateman 1990, 236-237;
8

241). When the welfare state was established women were not granted full citizenship through
property ownership, voting rights, and an opportunity to work (Pateman 1990, 231; 239).
Women’s roles as dependents, caretakers, and participants primarily in the private sphere are the
product of what scholars refer to as the patriarchal welfare state (Pateman 1990, 231).
Ideal citizens were also expected conform to public and personal conceptions of virtue
(Mink 1990, 95). As Mink explains, one’s character was tied to one’s ancestry, or one’s race
(1990, 95). Later, as the definition of citizenship was extended during the Jacksonian era and
following the Civil War, white male suffrage opened up citizenship to less traditionally virtuous
well as those who were perceived as not being capable of possessing virtue or self-reliance:
Blacks (Mink 1990, 96). When citizenship was finally extended to women it was still set apart
from that of men’s citizenship. Unlike men’s citizenship, women’s citizenship necessitated social
protections because of their roles as prospective mothers of future citizens (Mink 1990, 99). The
struggle to gain the rights of full citizenship served to stymie the progress of national welfare
programs and, when these programs were widely adopted, informed the construction of policies
during both the New Deal and the War on Poverty (Quadagno 1994, 191).
In part due to the socialization of motherhood, it was around the start of the twentieth
century that many states enacted sterilization laws in an effort to control motherhood (Thomas
1998, 422). The first state to pass a sterilization law, Indiana (1907) did so based on the idea that
undesirable characteristics were hereditary, dominant among the poor and indigent, and
necessary to stymie the spread of traits of laziness and sexual delinquency (Smith 2002; Thomas
1998, 422). During the 1920s, multiple state laws identified the poor and mentally unstable as the
main targets of sterilization policies due to their social undesirability (Mertus and Heller 1992,
377; Thomas 1996, 422). By 1922, fourteen states had sterilization laws—this number would
9

nearly double by the early 1930s (Smith 2002). As a result of these laws, many poor women and
women on welfare were sterilized (Thomas 1998, 422). It is estimated that 3,233 people were
sterilized due to these sterilization laws (Smith 2002).
In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld such policies in Buck v. Bell, arguing the practice was
necessary “in order to prevent our being swamped by incompetence” (Mertus and Heller 1992,
377). This ruling provided legal cover for the government to sterilize low-income and women of
color by labeling these women as mentally incompetent, or imbeciles (Mertus and Heller 1992,
378). Consequently, efforts to exterminate undesirable traits from society reached their peak in
the 1930s (Thomas 1998, 422). It was also during the 1930s that the US experienced an
expansion of social programs during the Great Depression, when the national government
returned as the major player in the prevention of poverty and homelessness (Orloff 1988, 40).
Among major New Deal reforms was the Social Security Act of 1935, perhaps the most
important of all New Deal reforms (Orloff 1988, 40). Included in this legislation was the Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) program established by Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, a
precursor to Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) program (Sapiro 1990, 37). At its
inception, AFDC mostly served white widows—“deserving” women according to political elites
and public officials (Thomas 1998, 442). However, as more unwed and women of color—the
“underserving” became eligible for public assistance, the conception of poverty as a maledominated phenomenon began to change (Thomas 1997, 354; Thomas 1998, 442).4

4

Two-thirds of the increase in welfare rolls between 1948-1962 was due to Black families (Moynihan
1965, 766). However, the absolute number of white families on welfare remained larger (Thomas 1997,
354).
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Racial theories contend the exclusion of Blacks from the New Deal and subsequent expansion of
the welfare resulted because of the alliance of northern industrial interests, who were intent on
controlling predominantly white labor, and southern political interests, which sought to control
their black populace. For Piven and Cloward (1993), the racial legacies that date to the formation
of the nation still shape the social welfare state.
From the 1930s to the 1960s the primary goal of social welfare programs was to assist
unemployed men and children who constituted the deserving poor (Ellwood 1988, 27). This goal
was accomplished through a combination of Social Security, employment-related benefits, and
means-tested programs (Ellwood 1988, 27). By 1960, Social Security benefits were allocated to
the aged, the completely disabled, and the children of workers who had died (Ellwood 1988, 27).
Welfare benefits were not extended to agricultural workers, a large percentage of whom
were African Americans (Ellwood 1988, 31). Also excluded from unemployment insurance were
workers in fields dominated by women, including, domestic workers, teachers, nurses, hospital
workers, librarians, and social workers (Albiston and Nielson 1994, 478). Moreover, many
minorities and women were prevented from receiving benefits by state implementation of the
Act (Albiston and Nielsen 1994, 479). For example, Black women with dependents were often
found to violate the “suitable home” requirement to receive Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
benefits (Albiston and Nielsen 1994, 479). Furthermore, Social Security benefits were connected
to wage levels, time in the workforce, and marital status—all factors which disadvantaged
women and minorities (Albiston and Nielsen 1994, 480). Gordon (1990) argues that ADFC was
founded on the assumption that women, acting as mothers, and children are to be supported by
men and promotes the norm of women’s domesticity (12, 14). Moreover, Gordon notes that
ADFC’s structure double-binds women by demanding that they remain in the private sphere, at
11

home acting as caregivers, but offer them insufficient support (1990, 14). Yet, while a wealthy
wife’s dependence to the husband and position in the home is encouraged, poor women are
expected to be independent (Gordon 1990, 14).
According to Thomas, the male-dominated conception of the culture of poverty that was
first developed in the 1950s and popularized in the 1960s asserts that poverty is a result of
individual behaviors and the solution is to alter individual values and behaviors through moral
education and resocialization (Thomas 1997, 353-354). Thomas argues that implicit in the
culture of poverty was a male-dominated view of poverty—that poverty was something that
happened to men and in turn affected women and children (1997, 354). Women were presumed
to be financially dependent on their husbands and would be protected from poverty as long as
their husbands were employed (Thomas 1997, 354).
This male-dominated perspective of poverty persisted as the country experienced an
increase in the number of Black female AFDC recipients, along with increasing divorce rates and
out-of-wedlock births which sparked political condemnation of the “personal flaws” of women
on welfare (Gordon 1994; Handler 1994; Thomas 1997, 354). These factors resulted in a
fundamental shift in how poverty was perceived in the United States. Instead of a male
phenomenon, the culture of poverty evolved into what Thomas refers to as the “culture of single
motherhood” (Thomas 1995; Thomas 1997). The culture of single motherhood was a femaledominated view of poverty which is characterized by widespread misconceptions of the
characteristics of women including hyper-sexuality, out-of-wedlock child births, perpetual
welfare dependence, etc. (Thomas 1997, 355). Like the culture of poverty, the culture of single
motherhood blamed poverty on the individual (Thomas 1997, 355). However, unlike the culture
of poverty, the culture of single motherhood did not see women’s impoverishment as a product
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of men’s poverty but rather, according to the culture of single motherhood, it was women’s and
mother’s failures that were at the root of poverty (Thomas 1997, 355).
Similar to the culture of single motherhood, other scholars refer to a phenomenon known
as the feminization of poverty. This scholarship emphasizes women’s historically higher poverty
rates among all age groups and racial subgroups (McLanahan and Kelly 2006, 134). While,
regardless of race, women have historically had higher rates of poverty it is important to note
that controlling for gender, Blacks had higher rates of poverty than Whites from 1950 to 2000
(McLanahan and Kelly 2006, 130). The feminization of poverty peaked among whites in 1970
and among Blacks a decades later (McLanahan and Kelly 2006, 134). After 1980 the
feminization of poverty continued among the elderly but tapered off among other subpopulations
(McLanahan and Kelly 2006, 134). This phenomenon can be explained by changing family
structure—such as rising divorce rates and a decline in marriage, rising birth rates—, economic
changes—such as the increase in working women—and changes to welfare policies (McLanahan
and Kelly 2006, 135-138).
Female-dominated views on poverty led to fertility legislation as a primary focus of statelevel lawmakers in the 1950s and 1960s (Thomas 1998, 423).5 In the 1950s, the sterilization
movement targeted women with out-of-wedlock children on AFDC (Thomas 1998, 422). At least
eighteen states proposed laws that required the sterilization of women on welfare or denied
assistance to “reproductively active single mothers,” who were deemed either immoral or amoral
(Thomas 1997, 355). However, these laws did not simply target women but rather focused on the
perceived faults of Black women.

5

Most of these laws focused on limiting reproduction of women receiving AFDC benefits (Thomas
1998).

13

While endorsing a bill that would require compulsory sterilization for mothers receiving
welfare benefits in 1957, North Carolina State Senator Wilbur Jolly claimed that poverty and
illegitimacy were “Negro problems…” which endangered the African American race (Thomas
1998, 423). Sterilization polices, Jolly argued, were the only way to stop welfare mothers from
continuing to “swamp” society with children possessing undesirable traits (Thomas 1998, 423).
Similarly, in 1958, Mississippi State Representative David Class defended legislation that would
establish court proceedings to determine if an unwed woman who gave birth to more than one
child while receiving welfare had a moral character which endangered society (Thomas 1998,
423). If the court found that the woman was a threat to society, the state could have her sterilized
(Thomas 1998, 423). Representative Class argued, “Negro women, because of child welfare
assistance, [are] making it a business, in some cases, of giving birth to illegitimate children…The
purpose of my bill was to try to stop, or slow down, such traffic at its source” (Thomas 1998,
425). The idea that Black women on welfare continued to procreate to receive more government
benefits remained prominent in public discourse until the 1990s welfare reforms (and beyond).
Thomas (1997) argued that, taken together, these legislative actions demonstrate the
racialization of women’s morality (357). Before the 1950s, both poverty rates and the number of
out-of-wedlock children were higher in Black communities (Thomas 1997, 357). Despite this,
political elites had not yet utilized imagery of immoral and hypersexual Black women in welfare
rhetoric (Thomas 1997, 357; Collins 1991). Thomas proposes that this was because before the
Civil Rights movement, Black women were easily oppressed without resorting to such imagery
and rhetoric (Thomas 1997, 357). It was not until Black women began to claim minimal levels of
political power in society during late 1960s and mid-1970s that political elites and public
officials racialized poverty debates (Thomas 1997, 357; Amott 1990, 287).
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Generally, the 1940s and 1950s were categorized by unequal access to welfare benefits
and other benefits from the New Deal for Black Americans as Southern state governments
worked to control eligibility requirements (Skocpol 1988; Amott 1990, 287). Black women in
the North were also blocked from accessing government benefits through various mechanisms
such as suitable home, man in the house, and substitute father policies, some of which were used
to specifically deny benefits to Black single mothers (Abramovitz 1988; Amott 1990, 288; Bell
1965).
Beginning in the 1960s, as part of the wave of Great Society legislation, welfare benefits
were subject to expansion as a result of changing perceptions of the welfare system. Welfare
went from being framed as charity, to being defined as a right of American citizenship (Ellwood
1988, 38). This change in attitude did not last long. Despite the fact that War on Poverty
attempted to substantively reform welfare policies, the changes were founded on the same old
assumptions of the Male Pauper and Male Breadwinner models of welfare that underpinned past
policies (Pearce 1990, 271). The former model presumed that the central problem of poverty was
unemployment among the poor (Pearce 1990, 271). This supposition was carried over to War on
Poverty programs that assumed that poor men needed jobs but were ill-equipped to enter the
labor market (Pearce 1990, 271).
By the 1970s Black women receiving welfare were subject to increasingly racial and
gendered stereotypes, for example, it was not unusual for doctors to refuse to deliver the children
of African American women on Medicaid unless the woman agreed to sterilization (Albiston and
Nielsen 1994, 482).6 By the 1980s the public consensus was dominated by the view that welfare

6

However, it would be inaccurate to claim that all was well for welfare recipients during this time. For
example, when he was governor of California, Ronald Reagan was a proponent of a 1970 policy proposal
to deny voting rights to recipients (Kohler-Hausmann 2015, 87) .
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recipients were responsible for their own misfortune and that welfare policies encouraged further
irresponsibility and that these problems were predominantly in the Black community (Weaver
2000, 171; Barany 2015, 204; Amott 1990, 280). In his 1986 State of the Union Address
President Reagan cited welfare for “the breakdown of the family” and that “welfare culture” was
to blame for “female and child poverty, child abandonment, horrible crimes, and deteriorating
schools” (Amott 1990, 290). The movement toward state rights and decentralization of the
federal government pioneered by the Reagan administration reached welfare policy through
increased state discretion and reduced spending (Barany 2015, 209). Increased state-level
decision-making permitted states to act as laboratories for various welfare reforms—most of
which sought to restrict eligibility (Barany 2015; 209, 213). It was also during this period of
restricted eligibility that AFDC benefits decreased: net expenditures for the program were nearly
$17 billion in 1975 but by 1986 this number had decreased to $14.7 billion (Amott 1990, 292
59).
By the mid-1990s public support for welfare had significantly declined (Schneider and
Jacoby 2005, 367). By this time, the myth of the culture of single motherhood, including the
intersection of racial and gendered stereotypes that underlie it, was commonly accepted (Thomas
1997, 357). It was from this basic assumption that legislators considered how to reform the
welfare system (Thomas 1997, 357). The myth of the culture of single motherhood was so
widely accepted that “an unusually broad spectrum of political elites” used it to endorse punitive
welfare policies such as the child cap and two-year limit (Thomas 1997, 357). Twelve states
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passed laws that denied mothers welfare assistance increases if she had a child while eligible for
welfare (Thomas 1997, 358).7
Proponents of such child cap policies argued that it was up to the government to address
the “irresponsible poverty behavior” of women (Tommy Thompson, Republican Governor of
Wisconsin, quoted in Thomas 1997, 358). Thompson argued for child caps and time limits on
AFDC despite studies that found no support for the assumption that women on welfare would
have more children to receive more welfare assistance (Thomas 1997, 359). Taking up this call,
Democratic President Bill Clinton, signed into law The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The law replaced AFDC with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), institutionalizing a time limit on benefits, reduced federal
spending on food stamps and Supplemental Security Income, and altered block grants to allow
for increased state discretion in determining eligibility requirements and assistance levels
(Barrany 2015, 220).
CRT and CRF analysis of the 1990s welfare reforms and subsequent TANF
reauthorizations identify three consistent themes, two of which are of interest to my research
(Limbert et al. 2005, 258). The first theme is an emphasis on the morality and value of work
(Limbert et al. 2005, 258). Work requirements are deeply intertwined with classical liberal
assumptions regarding self-sufficient individuals, as well as with public stereotypes about the
motivation of individuals and in particular the “laziness” of Blacks (Limbert et al. 2005, 260;
Avery and Peffley 2003; Gilens 1999; Quadagno 1994, etc.). In addition to the racial cast of the
critique is a gendered take on work, which dismisses the value of work inside the home (Limbert

7

The twelve states were: Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Virginia (Thomas 1997, 358).
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et al. 2005, 260; Mink 1998). The second theme is a fixation on marriage and out-of-wedlock
births (Limbert et al. 2005, 258). Idealized notions of Republican motherhood can be traced as
far back as the founding, but really came of age in the mid-19th century, as discussed previously.
CRT and CFT analysis of the political debates over “illegitimate births” find that much of the
congressional debate of the 1996 welfare reform relied on stereotypes of Black women,
motherhood, and “proper” construct of the family have their roots in this notion of Republican
motherhood.8
Another important welfare development of the 1990s was the proposed use of new birth
control technology as a device to temporarily sterilize women on welfare. In 1990 the Federal
Drug Administration approved the use of a new birth control technology, Norplant, to be used in
the United States (Mertus and Heller 1992, 359). Nearly immediately after the approval of
Norplant, state governments began to consider policies that would require its use for women on
welfare and in drug rehabilitation programs. As Mertus and Heller (1992) explain, proposed
policies using Norplant fell into two types. The first were policies that encouraged low-income
women who were receiving assistance to use Norplant through the usage of financial incentives
(Mertus and Heller 1992, 362).9 The second were policies that would have mandated the use of
Norplant for women who were convicted of drug use during their pregnancies or using certain
drugs regardless of if they were pregnant (Mertus and Heller 1992, 362).
By the middle of 1995, seventy bills in thirty-five states considered using Norplant as a
condition for welfare (Thomas 1997, 359). For example, two bills were introduced in the Kansas

8

A larger discussion of these stereotypes is in Chapter 1.
According to Smith (2002), “Most legal analyses of this welfare condition have concluded that conditioning the
receipt of an additional benefits on the temporary waiver of an individual’s right to have a child is constitutionally
impermissible.”
9
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legislature less than two months of the FDA approval of Norplant. The first proposed bill would
have provided Norplant for free and paid a $500 insertion bonus to women on public assistance
with an additional annual $50 bonus for each year women kept the device (Mertus and Heller
1992, 362). This proposal was rejected by the Kansas legislature after debate (Mertus and Heller
1992, 362).
The second Kansas proposal, which never got out of committee, would have required all
women convicted of certain drug crimes to use Norplant as a condition of their probation
(Mertus and Heller 1992, 362). Under this proposal, the woman would only be able to have the
Norplant removed after passing random drug tests for a year and with the order of a judge
(Mertus and Heller 1992, 362). Certain women would be exempt; women who could not have
children, and those who received a doctor’s note stating that they were unable to use Norplant
because of previous medical conditions (Mertus and Heller 1992, 362).
Similar bills were proposed in Ohio and South Carolina that would have mandated
certain pregnant women who used drugs be implanted with Norplant (Mertus and Heller 1992,
363). While neither bill was passed, both received serious consideration in state legislatures
(Mertus and Heller 1992, 363). As Mertus and Heller explain, policies which call for the
mandatory implantation of Norplant for welfare mothers originate from false notions of women’s
rights and historical ideas of eugenics (1992, 364). These policies can also be traced back to
prominent, and false, racial and gendered stereotypes related to laziness, promiscuity, fecundity,
etc.
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Connecting the Dots
Race and gender have consistently played a significant role in the development of welfare
policy in the United States. From its conception, the American welfare states has neglected
women and minorities. Starting with the first US welfare policy, Civil War pensions, women
were only granted assistance in their capacity as wives and widows and Blacks were completely
disregarded (Skocpol 1922; Albiston and Nielson 1994). When more women were given
assistance during the Progressive Era, they were only deemed worthy because of their roles as
mothers and caretakers (Orloff 1988; Nelson 1990; Mink 1990). Because of the importance of
motherhood in calculating women’s value to society and deservingness of government benefits,
various states enacted sterilization policies during the 1920s to control motherhood among lowincome women and women of color (Thomas 1988; Mertus and Heller 1922).
Even when the welfare state experienced changes under the New Deal, the system was
still categorized by unequal access for Black Americans and women (Thomas 1988; Amott
1990). Welfare benefits were denied to members of select professions that were mostly occupied
by Blacks, such as agricultural workers, and women, such as teachers and nurses (Albiston and
Nielson 1994). Black women, even when they were considered for assistance, were often denied
aid because they were found to violate requirements such as the “suitable home” condition
(Albiston and Nielson 1994).
Another wave of sterilization of poor women occurred in the 1950s and 1960s as a
reaction to prevalent race and gendered based assumptions of the causes of poverty (Thomas
1988). The War on Poverty itself was founded on such assumptions and, therefore, neglected the
needs of low-income Black Americans (Quadagno 1994). By the 1970s and 80s racist and sexist
stereotypes of welfare recipients were widely accepted and went on to influence the construction
20

of welfare policies (Pearce 1990; Weaver 2000; Barany 2015; Amott 1990). Use of such imagery
and rhetoric paints Blacks, and Black women, as being “other” and in need of control.
The pivotal role of race and gender in welfare policy persisted in more contemporary
welfare policies as represented by the 1990s federal welfare reforms. Specifically, creation of the
child cap, year limit, and work requirements policies can be explained, in part, because of
prevalent racist and sexist stereotypes. When efforts to pass laws that required temporary
sterilization of women on welfare through new birth control technology failed in the early 1990s,
lawmakers turned to child cap policies as another means to prevent women from having children.
Child cap policies of the mid-1990s are more contemporary iterations of US sterilization policies
dating back to the 1900s. Moreover, modern policies such as the child cap policy and state drugtesting policies of the 2010s rely on the same sexist and racist stereotypes which perpetuated the
formal and informal exclusion of women and Blacks from welfare and sterilization policies
throughout US history.
As this introductory chapter has shown, due to the importance of race and gender in the
development of the American welfare state, analyses of welfare policy should account for both
gender and race as well as the intersection of those identities. Furthermore, I detail how race and
gender remain significant to contemporary American welfare policies which are simply modern
iterations of the past racialized and gendered policies discussed in this chapter. I do so by
examining the 1996 welfare reforms through an intersectional lens, analyzing whether the
diffusion of drug-testing eligibility requirements is connected to various racial factors, and
implementing a novel experimental survey approach using racialized cues and varying framing
techniques to examine changes in Black and conservative respondent welfare preferences.
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Chapter 1
The War on Women Meets the War on Welfare: The Effect of the
Interaction of Gender and Race on Public Opinion on the 1996 Welfare
Reforms
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Introduction
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),
passed in 1996, was built on the back of the "Contract with America" campaign, developed by
House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga). The Contract argued that government welfare programs
"bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty" best captured by the explosion of young
women who had children to get welfare benefits (Gingrich et al. 1994, 65; Barany 2015, 204,
216).10 Even though such cases are actually rare, the perception that out-of-control teen births
account for a significant percentage of welfare recipients was accepted by lawmakers and the
general public alike (Barany 2015, 205). The Contract promoted a family cap policy, work
requirements after two years of receiving benefits, and an overall five-year limit for AFDC
recipients, all in order to end the “cycle of dependency” identified as the central problem
underlying poverty (Gingrich et al. 1994, 66; Barany 2015, 216).
The 1996 welfare reform law, in line with the Contract for America, established work
requirements, a five-years limit, and discretionary family cap policies for states, and included
block grants as well as education and home requirements which required teenage mothers to live
with their parents and finish school to receive government benefits (Barany 2015, 220). The fiveyear limit policy was born from the view that welfare programs bred a cycle of dependency
wherein the unemployed leeched off the system and possessed no desire to find gainful
employment. The family cap, also referred to as the child cap, resulted from the perception of a
welfare system over-run with overly fecund, irresponsible, unmarried, and young women who

10

According to National Vital Statistics Reports, around the time the "Contract with America" was written, young
women giving birth accounted for a small number of total annual births (Barany 2015, 204). Teen mothers
accounted for less than 6% of welfare recipients in 1993—and that percentage had been decreasing (Albiston 1994,
487).
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continued to have children even while on welfare. According to some reformers, the willingly
unemployed and unwed single mothers were an increasing financial burden on responsible,
taxpaying Americans.
Racist and sexist stereotypes dominated the public debate over both the five-year limit
and the child cap policies. These stereotypes dominated the debate by lawmakers, as well as the
public perception of welfare recipients. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the gendered
and racial messages that accompanied discussions of welfare influenced the opinions and
preferences of the populations targeted by these specific messages—Black Americans , and,
particularly, Black women.
Framing the Debate
The racist, classist, and sexist stereotypes that formed the prevailing perceptions of
welfare recipients during the nineties were long-standing. Many have noted the racialized and
gendered nature of the debate surrounding the 1996 welfare reforms (Hancock 2004; Sparks
2003; Cook and Barett 1992; Foster 2008, Thomas 1998, etc.). Perhaps the most utilized
stereotype of welfare recipients during the early and mid-nineties was that of the "welfare
queen." This rhetorical device is set apart from the other racial and gendered stereotypes because
of its intersectional nature.
One of the most persistent and well-established racial stereotypes essential to the welfare
queen identity is the belief that African Americans are inherently lazy and lack a proper work
ethic (Hancock 2004; Gilens 2001).11 Another component of the welfare queen identity is the

11

Other racial and gendered stereotypes regarding welfare recipients also included the idea that Black welfare
recipients were drug users whose drug addictions made them neglectful parents (Sparks 2003, 178-179). Such
portrayals were reinforced by the media and elected officials and the content of the welfare reforms (Sparks 2003,
179).
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intersectional stereotype that Black women are bad mothers and "hyper fertile"—conceptions
that date back to the practice of slavery (Albiston 1994, 481; Hancock 2004; 26, 30). In many
ways, the welfare queen's identity existed well before it was given its name and popularized by
President Reagan in the 1980s.
According to Reagan, welfare queens were urban (an implicit racial message) women
who incessantly reproduced with the goal of being eligible for additional government assistance,
drove Cadillacs, and used food stamps to purchase alcohol and cigarettes (Cook and Barett 1992;
Foster 2008, 164). Furthermore, this identity “[was] used to justify class-based sexist and racist
assumptions about the presumed behavior and moral failures of welfare mothers" (Fosters 2008,
194).
The identity of welfare queens and welfare mothers conjures a specific image: Black,
poor woman with multiple out-of-wedlock children (Albiston 1994, 486). Most of the American
public grew to accept this gendered and racialized stereotype and assumed that these women
overran the welfare system despite its inaccuracy—in 1993 most women on welfare were, in
fact, White (Albiston 1994, 487). Still, the legislative and public perceptions were of a Black
welfare queen. Those harboring these stereotypes assumed African American women would
have bad children who grow up to be bad people who, also, required public assistance (Albiston
1994, 481). It was proposed that this culture of poverty was passed from generation to generation
making the children of Black women on welfare social liabilities (Albiston 1994, 482).
The concept of welfare queens and this cycle of dependence was accepted and
perpetuated by President Reagan and many members of Congress during the eighties. In 1987
House Representative Marge Roukema (NJ-R) claimed that the welfare system made staying on
welfare rolls while having more children or avoiding gainful employment "attractive" (Barany
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2015, 211). Moreover, Roukema stated, "How much longer do you think the two-worker couple
will tolerate the welfare state and its costs to them in taxes to support that welfare mother?"
(Barany 2015, 211).
Single mothers, and particularly single African American mothers, were portrayed as
violating middle-class social norms and were, therefore, responsible for their impoverishment
(Foster 2008, 165). According to conservative lawmakers and policy experts, an American
underclass, composed of welfare queens, criminals, and the willfully unemployed, bogged down
the welfare system and drained working Americans of their hard-earned money (Foster 2008,
164). In response, American social policies sought to “correct” Black women's problematic
sexual behavior and by encouraging them to have children only after marriage (Foster 2008,
165). Welfare—a system dominated by poor, single women—is the only government assistance
program to establish family caps or marriage incentives (Foster 2008, 165). This rhetoric drew a
line between the poor who were poor due to no fault of their own—the deserving poor—and the
poor who were poor due to personal flaws—the undeserving poor (Foster 2008, 164). The
distinction between deserving and undeserving welfare recipients relies on the social
construction of target populations (Schneider and Ingram 1993). Social constructions affect
citizens' attitudes as they become fixed in a society (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 334).
According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), there are four types of target populations: the
advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants. Each population possesses either strong or
weak power and is associated with positive or negative constructions (Schneider and Ingram
1993). Welfare recipients can be framed as dependents—those with weak power and positive
constructions (the deserving poor) or as deviants—those with weak power and negative
constructions (the undeserving poor). Dependents are perceived as being worthy of receiving
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government assistance while deviants are not. In the debate over the 1996 welfare reforms, most
welfare recipients were framed as deviants—out of wedlock mothers, criminals, the willfully
unemployed, etc. Moreover, most of these deviants were thought to be Black.
An example of the negative social constructions perpetuated at the time is that of the
"sexually promiscuous teenage mothers" who opted to remain on welfare despite the opportunity
of gainful employment (Chanley and Alozie 2001, 5). In reality, most welfare recipients had one
or two children and, in a single spell, received benefits for less than two years, or less than four
years overall (Chanley and Alozie 2001, 5).
Like Ingram and Schneider (1993), Hancock's work on the 1996 welfare reforms
recognizes the importance of political context and political culture (2004, 2). Public identities are
formed from political contexts, and in a broader sense, are derived from political culture
(Hancock 2004, 4). These identities rely on pre-existing beliefs and stereotypes regarding race,
class, and gender already established in society. Moreover, these identities are shaped by outgroup perceptions, and to some degree, in-group perceptions of the group itself (Hancock 2004,
5 emphasis added). For the most part, political elites, such as political parties and governmental
officials, control these identities and reinforce them through by government actions and policies
(Hancock 2004, 5, 530). The negative public identities of welfare recipients were reinforced by
the debate surrounding, and ultimately the passage of, the 1996 welfare reforms.12

12

Hancock also conducts an analysis of 149 articles about welfare reform from five different newspapers and finds
significant support for the usage of the welfare queen identity. The most dominant element of the welfare queen
stereotype in the dataset were "Don't Work", "Teen Mothers", "Overly Fertile", and "Illegitimacy" (2004, 68).
Additionally, the author analyzes the 104th Congress' Congressional Record and found the following public identity
components: "Culture of Poverty", "Don't Work", "Single-Parent Family", "Illegitimacy", and "Cross-generational
Dependency".
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The use of public identities involves two important steps—the assumption of certain
behaviors and attributes of group members (usually by non-group members) and judgements on
the morality of those behaviors and traits (Hancock 2004, 16). The resultant judgements
determine the perceived relative deservingness of people on welfare. When recipients attempted
to articulate what they saw to be the legitimate problems with the welfare system during political
debates surrounding the 1996 reforms, they were largely ignored because of prevailing
assumptions about their moral character and behavior propagated by the welfare queen
stereotype and others like it (Hancock 2004, 62).
Chanley and Alozie (2001) reference the social construction categories created by
Schneider and Ingram (1993) in their work discussing the 1996 welfare reform bill and the
targeting and perception of battered women. The authors argue that government officials were
more concerned with social construct, rather than producing comprehensive policy (Chanley and
Alozie 2001, 1). The culmination of the social representations of certain populations—Blacks
and Black women—resulted in legislators and the media adopting an "oversimplified" idea of the
nature of the welfare system and welfare recipients (Chanley and Alozie 2001). The notion that
welfare recipients were generally irresponsible and lacked individual responsibility formed in a
policy window which made the passage of PRWORA possible (Chanley and Alozie 2001, 2).
The proposed solution to the alleged epidemic of laziness was to reform the welfare system to
discourage such behavior and to bring the system back to the American ideal of welfare—
serving the truly needy. By the 1980s and the 1990s such dogma was at an all-time high
(Chanley and Alozie 2001, 5).
In addition to the fact that reforms such as the time-limit and child cap policies were
proposals borne from exaggerated concerns and false perceptions of those receiving aid, the
31

ensuing debate of these reforms was laden with "symbolic and normative terms that focus on
specific aspects of an issue and characterizations of the target populations" (Chanley and Alozie
2001, 3). In other words, the debate, which should have focused on substantive policy changes,
was instead captured by misleading and false generalities which did nothing to address the real
flaws of the welfare system. Even populations which continued to be considered "deserving" by
the general public, such as battered women, suffered because of the reforms (Chanley and Alozie
2001).
Sparks (2003) notes that commentators frequently used the image of the welfare queen to
support their claims that the current welfare system was broken and needed to be reformed, and
that the only positive narrative that was sometimes invoked during the debate concerned
“welfare to work” stories that promoted examples of mothers who were able to stop relying on
welfare and become “respectable citizens” (171). According to Sparks, “countless legislators and
witnesses portrayed welfare recipients as black women who avoided paid employment, spent
their welfare checks on drugs and liquor, and neglected their many children” and “referenced
people who refuse to work” (2003, 178). In an examination of a random sample of documents
from the 104th Congress floor debates about the 1996 welfare reform law, Hancock finds that the
phrase “culture of poverty” was frequently used as a cue for the welfare queen rhetorical device
(2004, 94). In other words, the legislative debate on the topic used a combination of explicit and
implicit references to Blacks and Black women. The use of these sexist and racist stereotypes
was also prominent in the media.
In 1994, one of the years in my analysis, CNN, ABC, and most of the remaining major
newspapers in the country, covered a story concerning five Black welfare mothers and one Black
man who were accused of abusing nineteen children who were found in an apartment during a
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drug raid in Chicago (Sparks 2003, 179; Williams 1995, 1164-1166). Chanley and Alozie (2001)
explain how the media was unified in the frequent use of the welfare queen stereotype in news
coverage and images of teenage mothers who were hyper-sexual and willfully unemployed (5).
In an analysis of a sample of 149 news articles about welfare reform published in five major
newspapers between 1995 and 1996, Hancock (2004) finds that 73% had some or all of the text
units coded as dimensions of the welfare queen identity (68). Out of the sample, only one
occasion of a positive narrative of welfare mothers was found (Hancock 2004, 86). Hancock
concludes that “[t]he news media, by either intent or neglect, played a role in linking the social
construction of the welfare population to public policy options,” (2004, 87). It would make sense
that the dominance of these implicit, and at times explicit, references to race and gender in both
elite and media discussion of welfare would influence public opinion.
The Targeted Populations
As established, sexist, racist, and classist stereotypes dominated congressional and media
debate over the reforms (Hancock 2004; Sparks 2003). Numerous authors have evaluated how
these kinds of messages, namely racial messages, affect Whites’ political preferences and
opinions. Mendelberg (2001) offers the most comprehensive look at how both explicit and
implicit racial messages influence White respondents. Explicit messages use racial nouns or
adjectives, express anti-Black ideas, etc. Implicit messages communicate the same ideas, but do
so without using racial nouns or adjectives, alluding to racial stereotypes indirectly. Mendelberg
(2001) argues that explicit messages violate societal norms of racial equality and, therefore, are
largely rejected by Whites. However, implicit racial messages, like that of the welfare queen, fail
to be recognized as violating norms of racial equality and are likely to be accepted by White
respondents.
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There has been comparatively limited research regarding how minorities respond to racial
messaging. White (2007) goes beyond the work of previous scholars by analyzing how racial
messages and cues affect members of different racial groups. White (2007) offers the most
comprehensive examination of the potential differences between Black and White respondents in
response to the use of racial cues in political messages. The author provides a conceptual
framework to understand under what circumstances Black opinion is affected by racial messages.
White's (2007) theory diverges from that of Mendelberg (2001) in that White argues that
Mendelberg's justification for why White subjects reject explicit racial appeals, the violation of
established social norms of equality, do not extend to Black respondents (2007). Furthermore,
White (2007) argues that while modern norms of racial equality directly conflict with feelings of
racial prejudice in White respondents, there is no such conflict between the norms of equality
and Blacks' racial group identification.
White (2007) uses theories of Black opinion to help formulate his framework concerning
Black responses to racial appeals. Racial group identification, attachment, and feelings of linked
fate have been found to be strong influencers of Black opinion. In fact, many authors have found
that race matters more than other variables, like ideology and party identification, in explaining
Black policy attitudes (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tate 1993,
etc.) However, as White (2007) states, while racial group identification goes a long way in
explaining Black opinion on racial issues, there is not as much evidence that is does the same for
non-racial issues. In other words, we cannot assume that Blacks will automatically attach their
racial group identifications to issues that are not obviously racial. For non-racial issues that do
not have a racial cue, Whites and Blacks should evaluate the policy issue using the same
variables—ideology and partisanship.
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White (2007) uses the argument made by Cohen (1999), that Black communities often
reject the interests of "marginal groups" in pursuit of the larger group's agenda to suggest that the
effect of linked fate on Blacks is conditioned by which segment of the Black community is
referenced or affected by the issue. In White's words, "…this line of research suggests that the
effect of racial cues among Blacks may depend on what representations of Blacks the cues
invoke…" (White 2007, 3). Therefore, we should expect differences in the types of cues that
successfully activate racial thinking in Blacks as well as Whites (White 2007). The author argues
that implicit appeals that utilize references to marginal segments of the Black population may be
interpreted as not being in the interest of the community as a whole—and in the absence of an
explicit cue—Black respondents may reject feelings of group attachment or feelings of linked
fate (White 2007).
To evaluate this theoretical framework, White (2007) conducts two experiments. The first
analyzes support for the Iraq War utilizing both explicit and implicit racial frames. Under the
explicit cues, White (2007) found that in-group identification in Blacks was a significant
predictor of less favorable opinions of the use of military force. The results for White
respondents supported the argument made by Mendelberg (2001). Under the implicit frame,
African American support for the war was not significantly affected. White (2007) theorized that
because the implicit cue made reference to social welfare programs, Black respondents could
have been primed to think of more marginal segments of the Black community. To determine the
validity of this theory, White conducted a second experiment.
This second experiment focuses on food stamp programs. This experiment is unique for
its use of two different types of implicit racial appeals—one which refers to "inner city families"
and one which refers to "poor Americans" (White 2007, 11). The former is associated with
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negative perceptions such as city ghettos and urban crime (i.e. marginal segments of the
population) while the latter appeals to broad concerns related to poverty. The effect of the racial
cues generally follows White’s expectations except within the “poor Americans” non-marginal
racial cue which failed to activate racial attitudes in support for government spending on food
stamps (2007, 9). Exposure to the inner-city condition, however, White respondents’ out-group
resentment significantly influences levels of support for spending on food stamps (White 2007,
9).
Black respondents assigned to the inner-city cue, the marginal implicit racial cue,
experience no change in their use of racial attitudes in the formation of their preferences about
food stamp spending (White 2007, 10). However, White (2007) notes that Black respondents
exposed to the inner-city cue were twice as likely to mention crime as an important issue than
those in the control group—this was the only condition for Black subjects that experienced any
significant change (White 2007, 11). White (2007) cites other scholars that have made the
connection between race, welfare, and crime such as Mendelberg (1997) and Valentino (1999).
From this change, White (2007) suggests that Black respondents were more likely to be
thinking about negative representations of their racial group under the inner-city cue (11). The
poor Americans frame successfully activated in-group identification among Black subject,
significantly increasing support of food stamps (White 2007, 11). White (2007) theorizes that the
marginal implicit appeal's association to a criminal class of the Black community activated racial
thinking among Blacks while the non-marginal implicit appeal failed to do so because it lacked
such a reference to marginal groups.
While White (2007) uses the term "marginal" to describe the more putatively negative
segments of the population we could also use the term “undeserving.” In White's study, Black
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respondents perceived certain parts of their community as being undeserving—those on welfare
(perhaps for the same stereotypes and perceptions discussed earlier), criminals, etc. Therefore, it
may be that Blacks, in addition to Whites, see certain people as being undeserving for
government assistance even if they are of the same race.
Similar results have been found in studies examining how women respond to targeted
sexist messaging. Barreto and Ellemers (2005) study implicit versus explicit sexist messages.
The authors refer to explicit messages as "old-fashioned" sexist views and implicit messages as
"modern sexism" (Barreto and Ellemers 2005, 75). Echoing the findings of Mendelberg (2001)
on racial messages, Barreto and Ellemers (2005) conclude that modern sexist appeals express
similar ideas as old-fashioned sexism but do so in a seemingly inoffensive manner and, therefore,
are not frequently challenged (75).
By conducting an experiment where both male and female respondents are presented with
implicit and explicit sexist appeals by both female and male sources, the authors find that
implicit sexist appeals are more often accepted, even by the targeted population—women
themselves (Barreto and Ellemers 2005). The authors present two possible theories explaining
women's response to sexist appeals. The first response to explicit messages is that women may
experience feelings of anger toward the source of the message and seek to confront the source to
regain control of the situation—a fight response (Barreto and Ellemers 2005). The second
possible response is that of self-directed insecurity and anxiety which results in inaction—a
flight response that accompanies implicit appeals (Barreto and Ellemers 2005).
Results of the author's experiment reveal that men and women agree with implicit sexist
messages to a similar degree. However, female respondents were less likely to perceive prejudice
in implicit sexist messages compared to male respondents (Barreto and Ellemers 2005).
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Moreover, the experiment found that women experienced more feelings of anxiety in response to
implicit appeals and have more feelings of anger and hostility to explicit messages (Barreto and
Ellemers 2005).
My study explores how implicit and explicit messaging alters public opinion regarding
welfare policy, with a focus on the time limit and the child cap policies associated with the 1996
Act. While there are numerous studies analyzing public opinion data and the 1996 welfare
reforms, my work fills the gaps in the current literature by looking at the intersection of gender
and race, controlling for gender-based effects, and lengthening the time period under study
(Weaver 2000; Soss et al. 2001; Hetling, McDermott, and Mapps 2008; Duncan and Caspary
1997).13 In short, there is room for more research on public opinion of the 1996 welfare reforms.
Theory
White (2007) suggests that the marginal nature of certain implicit racial appeals bypass
Blacks' sense of linked fate. Marginal claims, according to White (2007), include references to
either criminals or welfare recipients. However, White (2007) finds that when an implicit cue
refers to a non-marginal segment of the Black population—in this case poor Blacks—Black
support for food stamps increases. Yet, food stamps are a welfare program and, therefore, should
have failed to activate in-group racial identification within Blacks. Perhaps there is another kind
of distinction between marginal and nonmarginal implicit messages.

13

Weaver (2000) examined Gallup polls, making it difficult to control for factors such as ideology, gender, race, etc.
Soss, et al. (2003) do not include an interaction between gender and race, and as such their analysis cannot fully
examine the intersectional nature of these identities. Hetling et al. (2008) use gender as a control variable, not as a
main variable of interest. Duncan and Caspary (1997) do not examine differences in opinion between the genders, or
to include an interaction between gender and race. Finally, none of these studies examine more than one
year
of data to observe potential changes in opinion over time as respondents were further exposed to racial and sexist
rhetoric related to the welfare reforms.
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The marginal implicit cue in White's (2007) study, inner-city families, is associated with
images of Black ghettos and urban crime—strictly negative depictions. If we put this in context
of Schneider and Ingram's (1996) social constructions framework, we could also think of these
marginal segments of society as "deviants"—those with little political power and are perceived
negatively. While the implicit cue of poverty, still a marginal part of the Black population, may
be closer to "dependents"—those with little political power but positive perceptions.
Generally, poverty is perceived as being caused by either individual factors or structural
factors (Hunt 1996). Researchers have found that Blacks are much more likely than Whites to
attribute poverty to structural factors (Hunt 1996; Feagin 1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Hunt
(1996) presents two possible explanations for this racial difference. The first is that perceptions
of poverty are driven by economic self-interest—members of groups that are disproportionately
disadvantaged and low income (including African Americans and women) are more apt to hold
more structuralist views about what causes poverty (Hunt 1996). As Hunt explains, structuralist
views are interrelated with socioeconomic status (1996, 298).
The second explanation posits that members of minority groups identify with the general
experiences of their racial group even if they themselves have not experienced those same
difficulties. In other words, there is a sense of linked fate which motivates Black's views of the
causes of poverty (Hunt 1996, 298). It may be that Blacks, unlike Whites, assume that
impoverishment results from circumstances outside of an individual's control (Iyengar 1990).
However, it may be that African Americans’ likelihood of believing that structural factors
are to blame for a person's impoverishment depends on the type of implicit cue that is used to
frame the impoverished. If a marginal cue is used, African Americans may be more likely to
believe that it is individualistic factors that result in people's poorness. If a non-marginal cue is
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used, African Americans may be more likely to believe that structural factors are to blame for a
person's poorness.
Due to the extensive number of studies conducted examining how Whites respond to
racial political messaging, we can make reasonably strong predictions about the policy
preferences of White respondents in the datasets analyzed. Generally, I expect that the implicit
racial messages used during the debate surrounding welfare reform will activate Whites' racial
thinking. I expect that Whites will: be less supportive of government spending on
welfare/assistance to the poor, hold a less favorable opinion of welfare recipients, be more
supportive of child cap and two-year/five-year limit reforms, and be more accepting of the
welfare queen stereotype. I also expect that these preferences among Whites will become
stronger over time due to the continuing dominance of racial, sexist, and classist stereotypes
utilized in public debate and codified in law. Moreover, I expect that White panelist who
watched more days of news per week will become significantly more supportive of welfare
spending, colder toward recipients, and more favorable toward both the child cap and two-year
reform from 1994 to 1996 than White panel respondents who report watching fewer days of
news per week.
Predictions regarding Black respondents are less certain given the lack of research
concerning Black responses to racial cues. Generally, there are two ways Black respondents
could react to the racial messaging of the 1996 welfare reforms. First, and as I predict, Black
respondents could reject feelings of linked fate due to references to the marginal segments of the
Black community—welfare recipients and the negative stereotypes surrounding recipients such
as laziness and drug use. This would result in Black respondents becoming less favorable toward
welfare spending/assistance to the poor, holding a low opinion of welfare recipients, be more
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favorable of the 1996 welfare reforms. Alternatively, Black respondents could retain
their feelings of linked fate and sympathize with the circumstances of other Blacks even if they
themselves have not experienced those same circumstances and favor increased welfare
spending/assistance to the poor, have a favorable opinion of welfare recipients, be unfavorably
disposed towards the 1996 welfare reforms, and reject the welfare queen stereotype.
Research Design
I examine American National Elections Survey (ANES) panel data from 1994 and 1996
to look for changes in opinion on welfare spending, welfare recipients, support for time limits
and support for child cap reforms. In these years, respondents were asked about various topics
including their opinions toward welfare spending, welfare recipients, the two-year reform, and
the child cap reform. By examining panel respondents, I can observe the same individuals in
1994 and 1996 to examine any changes in their preferences over time while keeping all other
variables relatively constant. However, the major limitation of using the ANES panel data is that
there are few responses from of African Americans—and African American women in
particular. In 1994 there are 202 Black respondents (84 men and 118 women). In 1996 there are
207 African American respondents (79 men and 128 women).
The problem of having only a relatively small sample of African American survey
respondents is mitigated by the fact that I am examining panel data. Another limitation of the
analysis is that I cannot be sure that any changes over time are due to exposure to racist and
sexist messages. However, I do analyze how news consumption influenced the preferences of
White and Black respondents to attempt to isolate the prospective influence of these messages on
welfare preferences.
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To analyze the data, I conduct paired t-tests and chi-squared tests comparing opinions on
welfare spending, welfare recipients, and support for time limits and child cap reforms for each
combination of race and gender from 1994 to 1996. I examine four dependent variables: welfare
spending, welfare recipient thermometer ratings, support for the two-year limit, and support for
the child cap reform. The welfare spending variable is coded 0-2 with the lowest value indicating
that respondents wish to see welfare spending decreased and the highest value indicating wanting
to increase spending on welfare. The welfare recipient thermometer scale ranges from 0-100 with
higher values representing warmer feelings about recipients. Finally, the two-year limit and child
cap reform variables are binary variables coded 0 if the respondent opposed the reform and 1 if
they favored the reform.
Finally, I also conduct analyses studying how news consumption affected respondent’s
preferences from 1994 and 1996 using a question from the 1994 and 1996 ANES survey which
asked respondents how many days per week they watched the news. I divided the variable into
more days per week and fewer days per week for the analysis. I expect that respondents who
watched more days of news per week will become less supportive of spending, rate recipients
lower, and become more supportive of both reforms than their counterparts who watch fewer
days of news per week. It is important to note that because my analysis of public opinion of the
1996 welfare reforms is reliant on a survey designed by others, I must infer opinion from the
questions posed and limit my analysis to those sampled in the survey. My examination of
marginal and non- marginal implicit cues, however, is extended to the present day in Chapter 3.
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Results
Welfare Spending
Survey question: Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or kept
about the same?

Most Black panel respondents wanted to see welfare spending kept about the same in
1994 (52.27%) while most White panelists wanted to see spending decreased (56.01%). As
evident from the percentages in in Table 1, most White women (50.32%) and White men
(62.03%) expressed a desire to see federal spending on welfare programs decreased which also
matches my expectations. Yet, White women were significantly more likely to support spending
on welfare than their male counterparts (p≤.01). Most Black women (53.70%) and just over 39%
of Black men wanted to see spending on welfare kept stable in 1994. White women were
significantly less likely to support spending on welfare compared to Black women (p≤.05) but
not Black men while White men were significantly less supportive of spending compared to both
Black women and Black men at the p≤.01 level. There were no significant differences between
the spending differences of Black women and Black men in 1994.
[Table 1 about here]
Nearly 35% of Black panel respondents wanted spending stable while nearly 40% wanted
to see it decreased in 1996. Comparatively, a majority of White panelists (59.55%) wanted to see
spending on welfare programs decreased in the same year. As in 1994, most White women and
White men wanted to decrease welfare spending in 1996 (57.53% and 61.85%, respectively). As
for Black respondents, 39.29% of Black women wanted welfare spending to be kept about the
same in 1996. The second highest percentage of Black women, nearly 31%, reported that they
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wanted to see spending increased in 1996. Just over 41% of Black men wanted spending to be
decreased in 1996 while the second highest percentage wanted to see spending kept about the
same.
Once again, White women were significantly more likely to express support for
government spending on welfare than their male counterparts in 1996 (p≤.05) and less likely to
support increased spending when compared to Black women (p≤.01). However, unlike in 1994,
White women were significantly less likely than Black men to want to increase spending (p≤.05).
As in 1994, White men were less likely than both Black women and Black men to want to
increased spending in 1996, significant at the p≤.01 level. Finally, there were statistically
significant differences between Black women and Black men in 1996, unlike in 1994, with Black
women being more likely to want to increase spending (p≤.10).
Based on chi-square tests, I found that White women and White men became
significantly less supportive of welfare spending from 1994 to 1996 at the p≤.01 level which
supports my hypotheses. Black women, however, became more supportive of government
spending on welfare over time (p≤.10). Black men did not experience any significant change in
spending preferences from 1994 to 996.
[Table 2 about here]
Welfare Recipient Thermometer Ratings
Survey question: How would you rate people on welfare?
In 1994, the mean thermometer rating among White panel respondents was 45.66
compared to Black panelists who rated recipients at 59.07 on average. As shown in Table 3,
White women rated welfare recipients at 44.78 out of 100 on average in 1994. This was slightly
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higher than White men who, on average, rated recipients 42.75 out of 100 (p≤.10). Black women
rated recipients significantly higher than all other subgroups rated them at the p≤.01 level with an
average of 61.83. Despite rating recipients lower than Black women did, with an average rating
of 53.15, Black men still rated recipients significantly higher than both White women and White
men did (p≤.01).
These results for 1994 suggest that being a Black woman was related to attitudes about
welfare recipients in a uniquely strong way, and that the importance of being a Black woman
could not be reduced to the separate facts of being Black and being a woman. Black men rated
welfare recipients roughly 10 points higher than White men, and White women rated recipients
roughly two points higher than White men. If the effects of race and gender on ratings of
welfare recipients were simply additive, we would expect Black women to rate recipients
roughly 12 points higher than White men, but the actual difference was 19 points.
The mean ratings of welfare recipients among Black women and Black men were not
statistically different in 1996 than they were in 1994. On average, Black women placed
recipients at 62.98 out of 100 while Black men had an average rating of 61.89—the difference
between these ratings was not statistically different. This means that Black panel respondents
became neither significantly warmer nor significantly colder toward people receiving welfare
from 1994 to 1996.
Black panelists provided a mean thermometer rating of 62.54 compared to their White
counterparts, who rated recipients at 49.44 on average in 1996. On average, White women rated
recipients 50.50 out of 100 and White men rated recipients slightly lower, with a mean rating of
48.40 in 1996. Even though White women's and White men's thermometer ratings of people on
welfare were not significantly different from one another in 1996, both subgroups rated welfare
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recipients significantly higher in 1996 than in 1994 at the p≤.01 level. This finding does not
support my hypothesis that White panel respondents would become increasingly colder toward
welfare recipients over time. Black panelists did not significantly alter their ratings of recipients
from 1994 to 1996.
[Table 3 about here]

Child Cap Reform
Survey question: Some people have proposed that a woman on welfare who has another child not
be given an increase in her welfare check. Do you favor or oppose this change in welfare policy?

Nearly 72% of White panel respondents favored the child cap reform in 1994 while a
majority of Black panelists (about 52%) opposed the cap. As displayed in Table 5, most White
women, White men, and Black men supported the child cap reform in 1994 (73.94%, 72.17%
and 54.55% respectively). The only group in which a majority did not support the reform was
Black women with over 55% expressing opposition. While there were no significant differences
between levels of support for the child cap between White women and White men or Black men,
White women were more likely than Black women to favor the reform (p≤.01). White men were
significantly more likely to express support for the child cap reform in 1994 than Black women
and Black men, with the difference being significant at the p≤.01 and p≤.05 levels, respectively.
There were no significant differences between Black women and Black men on support of the
child cap reform in 1994.
In 1996, a majority of Black and White panelists expressed support for the child cap
reform, with favorably at nearly 59% and 72%, respectively. In 1996, 71.83% of White women
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and 71.40% of White men expressed their support of the reform. Majorities of Black women and
Black men supported the reform in 1996—57.75% of Black women and 60.42% of Black men.
Unlike two years prior, most Black women supported the child cap reform in 1996. As in 1994,
there were no significant differences between the preferences of White women and White men or
White women and Black men in 1996 regarding the child cap reform. White women remained
significantly more likely to support the reform than Black women in 1996 (p≤.05). White men
were significantly more likely to support the cap than Black women (p≤.05) but there were no
significant differences between Black men and White men. Finally, as was in 1994, there were
no significant differences between Black women and Black men on the child cap in 1996.
Based on chi-square tests, I found that Black women became significantly more
supportive of the child cap reform from 1994 to 1996 (p≤.10). This indicates that my hypothesis
that Black women were influenced by prominent negative stereotyping may be supported. Black
men, however, did not significantly change from 1994 to 1996 regarding preferences toward the
child cap. While exposure to racist and sexist implicit messages in both elite discourse and media
coverage could explain this change over time, it is difficult isolate what, exactly, was influencing
Black women’s preferences at the time.
[Table 4 about here]
Two-Year Limit Reform
Survey question: Another proposal is to put a two year limit on how long someone can receive
welfare benefits. Do you favor or oppose this two year limit?

A majority of White panel respondents (80.07%) favored the two-year limit reform in
1994 compared to their Black counterparts, 57.14% of whom supported the reform. Results for
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subgroups’ preferences toward the two-year limit reform are shown in Table 7. A majority of
White men (81.84%), White women (78.32%), Black women (53.85%), and Black men
(62.50%) supported the two-year limit in 1994. There were no significant differences in support
for the two-year limit between White women and White men in 1994. White women were more
likely than both Black women and Black men to express support for the policy, at p≤.01 and
p≤.10, respectively. The same can be said of White men, at the p≤.01 and p≤.05 levels. There
were no significant differences concerning levels of support for the two-year limit between Black
women and Black men in 1994.
A majority of Black (62.50%) and White panelists (80.81%) expressed support for the
two-year limit in 1996. In 1996, 80.22% of White women, 81.46% of White men, 66.20% of
Black women and 57.14% of Black men supported the two-year limit reform policy. Once more
there were no significant differences between White female and White male panel respondents.
White women and White men remained significantly more likely than both Black women and
Black men to support the limit reform in 1996. Finally, as was the case in 1994, Black women
and Black men did not significantly differ in their preferences toward the two-year limit in 1996.
Chi-square tests find no significant differences between Black women’s or Black men’s two-year
limit preferences from 1994 to 1996 which contradicts my expectations.
News Consumption or Party Identification?
What explains the observed changes in subgroups over time? To determine if changes
were, in fact, related to the regular use of marginal implicit racial messages in elite discourse and
media coverage, I conducted a series of regressions and estimated predicted probabilities to
determine if the number of days respondents reported watching the news per week—divided into
low consumption (four days or fewer) and high consumption (five or more days)—had a
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significant effect on changes in respondent’s preferences relating to spending, recipient
thermometer ratings, support for the child cap, and support for the two-year limit reform from
1994 to 1996. Because the data are panel data, I assume other variables such as marital status,
education levels, etc. remain relatively constant.
In predicted probabilities analyzing the difference between subgroup’s spending
preferences, thermometer ratings, levels of support for the child cap, levels of support for the
two-year limit reform from 1994 and 1996 including the news consumption variable, I find no
significant differences within subgroups and the number of days they watched news per week. In
other words, members of each subgroup who reported watching more news per week did not
experience more change in their preferences over time compared to those who watched less
news. The analyzes of Black women and Black men included a small sample within each
subgroup ranging from thirty-six to forty-one Black women and twenty to twenty-three Black
men.
What other factor could explain the changes over time? Particularly, what could have
caused Black women to become significantly more supportive of the child cap reform in 1996?
Another possible explanation is party identification. In addition to marginal implicit messages,
another explanation for the increased support of the child cap over time could be that the 1996
welfare reforms were relatively bipartisan. Mink (1999) notes that the coalition of members of
Congress who supported the reforms was diverse and included members of both major parties
(174). It could be that Black female panel respondents, over 89% of whom identified as
Democrats in 1996, became more supportive of the child cap because it was supported by the
Democratic Party, and not only the Republican Party. Nevertheless, examining how
partyidentification may have influenced Black women’s welfare preferences, principally in
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relation to levels of support for the child cap, is hindered by the small sample size of Black
female panelists in the ANES data and confounded by the fact that only three Black women
identified as Republican and two as independent in 1996.
[Tables 5-8 about here]
Supplementary Analysis
To determine if my findings are consistent across surveys, I also analyzed two other
surveys—the 1996 National Black Election Study (NBES) and the Kaiser Foundation’s 1995
Welfare Survey. The NBES has a larger sample of Black respondents compared to the ANES
panel data. However, the NBES data only covers one year, which limits my ability to observe
changes in opinion over time. The Kaiser Foundation’s survey focuses on welfare preferences
and includes questions that are of interest, specifically, those asking respondents about women
having children while on welfare and perceptions on the causes of poverty. However, as with the
NBES data, it only covers one year and has an even smaller sample of Blacks than the ANES
panel data. Full tables related to the analysis from the 1996 NBES and the 1994 Kaiser
Foundation surveys are in the appendix.14
Kaiser Family Foundation 1995 Survey
Unlike the NBES 1996 data, I do not have ANES panel data from 1995 to compare to the
Kaiser Foundation’s survey. However, the Kaiser Foundation survey asked two questions similar
on both the NBES and ANES surveys regarding spending on assistance for the poor and support
for the child cap reform. According to the Kaiser Foundation data for 1995, a little over 70% of

14

NBES analysis includes t-tests comparing gender/race categories as well regressions including interaction terms
and a variety of demographic controls such as education, income level, and age. The Kaiser Foundation analysis
consists of similar regressions.
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Black women and nearly 95% of Black men believed the government was spending too little on
welfare.15 A majority of white women and men also believed the government was not spending
enough on welfare—67.76% and 59.11%, respectively. According to an ordered logistic
regression controlling for a variety of demographic variables,16 Black men had lower odds of
believing that the government was spending too much on assisting the poor compared to Black
women by a factor of .30 (p≤.10).
According to the 1995 Kaiser Foundation survey, a slight majority of Black women,
52.38%, opposed the child cap reform while the majority of Black men, nearly 58%, favored the
policy.17 Most White respondents favored the child cap (about 66%). There were no significant
differences between subgroups—most likely due to the small sample size.
Since the Kaiser Foundation survey focused on welfare preferences, respondents were
asked questions not included in either the ANES or the NBES surveys that speak to my
research—a question concerning the causes of being poor and two questions referencing the
welfare queen stereotype. The first asked respondents if it was a lack of jobs or a lack of effort
that caused people to be poor.
The only subgroup in which a majority believed it was a lack of effort was White men at
nearly 57%. Black women, at nearly 85%, Black men, at nearly 79%, and White women, at
nearly 53%, believed that it was a lack of jobs that caused poverty. There were no significant
differences between Black women and Black men. However, Black women’s ideas about
poverty were significantly different from White women’s and White men’s. Being a White
15

For the welfare spending question the sample sizes for Black women and men were small. Only 48 Black women
and 36 Black men answered the question.
16
Full model is in appendix.
17
Once again, the Black respondent sample size for this question is relatively small—42 Black women and 38 Black
men answered the question.
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woman rather than a Black woman increased the odds of a respondent attributing poverty to
individual causes by a factor of 2.91 (p≤.01). Being a White man rather than a Black woman
increased the odds by a factor of 4.63 (p≤.01). Black women had the lowest predicted probability
of believing individual rather than economic factors are the primary reason for poverty at .49.
A majority of all subpopulation respondents believed that welfare encouraged women to
have children—77.92% of White women, 76.06% of White men, 60.87% of Black women, and
55.56% of Black men. While there were no significant differences between subpopulations on
this question, Black women had the highest predicted probability of believing that welfare
encouraged women to have children and Black men had the lowest.18
Perhaps the most interesting finding within the Kaiser Foundation data is that 79%
percent of Black women cited women having more children as a major reason people were on
welfare—compared to 50% of Black men, nearly 60% of White men, and nearly 70% of White
women. While there were no significant differences between White women and Black women,
both White men and Black men were significantly more likely than Black women to believe that
women having children was not a reason people were on welfare. There are at least two probable
explanations of this finding. One is that Black women came to accept the welfare queen
stereotypes. The second is Black women recognized the significant financial burden associated
with motherhood caused Black women to turn to welfare for assistance.19

18
19

Full tables and analysis in appendix.
Forty-eight Black women and 40 Black men answered this question. Full analysis is in the appendix.
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National Black Election Study 1996
As previously stated, I also analyze the NBES (1996) to get a more comprehensive
understanding of Black opinion toward welfare the welfare reforms. I conducted an orderedlogistic regression to examine preferences toward welfare spending, an OLS regression to
evaluate welfare thermometer ratings, and finally logistic regression to analyze levels of support
of the child cap and two-year limit reforms.20
On the issues of spending on welfare programs, 63% of Black women and 60% of Black
men wanted to keep spending on food stamps about the same. This is considerably higher than
the results of the ANES panel data for the same year. However, it should be noted that
respondents in the NBES survey were specifically asked about their preferences regarding “food
stamps” while ANES respondents were questioned about “welfare.” It may be that the use of
these two different terms primed respondents to think along the lines of deserving (food stamps)
and the undeserving (welfare).
The mean thermometer rating for welfare recipients was 52 among Black men and 51
among Black women according to the 1996 NBES data. These ratings are lower than Black
women’s and men’s rating of recipients within the ANES panel data for the same year—about 63
and 62 respectively. However, the NBES ratings do show that majorities of both Black women
and men had favorable perceptions of welfare recipients.
According to the NBES data, Black men were nearly equally divided on the issues of
child cap policies—49.65% opposed the reform and 50.35 favored it. Black women were also

20

Control variables: age, income, party identification, ideology, education level, marital status, number of children,
employment status, importance of religion, how many days the respondent watched the news in the previous week,
how many days the respondent read a newspaper in the previous week, and if the respondent receives TANF
benefits.
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nearly evenly divided on the issue with about 47% opposed to the cap and about 53% in favor.
However, a majority of both groups expressed support for the reform, as was the case with the
ANES data. According to a logistic regression of child cap reform preferences that controlled for
various demographic variables,21 Black women were more supportive of the child cap reform by
a factor of 1.60 (p≤.05).22
Nearly 65% of Black men and about 70% of Black women favored the five-year time
limit reform in 1996 according to NBES. Once again, favorability of the reform is considerably
higher in the NBES than in the ANES panel data—favorability was just over 57% among Black
men and nearly 60% among Black women. Despite those differences, both datasets show a
majority of Black respondents supporting the time limit policy.
Conclusion
In terms of overall percentages and means, White women and White men remained
relatively stable in their preferences toward welfare spending, support for the child cap reform,
and support for the two-year limit. However, White women and White men rated welfare
recipients significantly higher on the thermometer scale in 1996 than in 1994 (p≤.01). The fact
that both White women and White men rated recipients higher over time does not support my
expectations. What explains this change? It is possible that media coverage of welfare became
more positive following the passage of the reforms (Avery and Peffley 2003, 131). In other
words, it could be that the reforms were perceived as a success in 1996 and, therefore, White
panel respondents assumed that “underserving” recipients had been removed from welfare rolls.

21

Variables controlled for in the model include: income, party identification, ideology, education, marital status,
employment status, religion, whether the respondent read newspaper, and whether they had children.
22
Party identification and marital status were also significant in the model. The full table is available in appendix.
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I found that overall, Black panelists remained stable in their rating of welfare recipients
and the two-year limit reform. However, Black women became significantly more supportive of
spending on welfare and, as predicted, became more supportive of the child cap reform from
1994 to 1996. The explanation for this unexpected finding relating to levels of support for
welfare spending could be similar to the explanation of the same findings for White panelists;
Black women may have believed that the reforms were successful in attaining their goals and,
therefore, became more supportive of increased spending in 1996. These findings suggest that
differences between Black women’s welfare preferences and White men’s extends beyond being
the sum of differences between White men and White women and between White men and Black
men. Black women’s preferences cannot simply be understood from an additive perspective of
race and gender. There is something unique in how Black women developed their welfare
preferences.
In other words, these results reinforce the importance of emphasizing intersectionality in
political science analysis. By analyzing just gender or race, the highly distinctive preferences of
Black women regarding welfare spending, the child cap, and two-year limit, rooted in the
circumstances of unique to Black women, could have been overlooked. The relative importance
of intersectionality is especially relevant given how significant gender and racial identities were
in the development of the 1996 welfare reforms which emphasized classist, racist, and sexist
stereotypes of welfare recipients as a way to promote welfare policies that sought to control the
behavior of primarily minority populations.
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Table 1: Welfare Spending Preferences by Gender and Race (ANES)
WELFARE
SPENDING

White
Women
1994

White
Women
1996

White
Men

White
Men

Black
Women
1994

Black
Women
1996

Black
Men

Black
Men

1994

1996

1994

1996

Decreased

50.32%

57.53%

62.03%

61.85%

27.78%

29.76%

35.29%

41.38%

Same

33.33%

31.64%

30.51%

32.18%

53.70%

39.29%

50.00%

39.66%

Increased

16.35%

10.83%

7.46%

5.97%

18.52%

30.95%

14.71%

18.97%

Table 2: Mean Ratings of Welfare Recipients by Gender and Race,
(1994/1996 ANES)

White Women
White Men
Black Women
Black Men

1994
Mean
45.42
(1.58)
44.75
(1.35)
64.84
(4.09)
55.75
(3.54)

1996
Mean
51.57
(1.38)
48.91
(1.18)
61.88
(2.46)
59.75
(4.90)

T-test
6.15***
(1.34)
4.16***
(1.24)
2.97
(4.56)
4.00
(5.67)

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Ratings are on a scale of 0-100 with higher values
indicating warmer feelings about recipients. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*. T-test column
shows one-tailed p-values for differences of mean ratings between 1994 and 1996.
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Table 3: Opinion on Child Cap Reform by Gender and Race (ANES)
CHILD
CAP
Oppose

White
Women
1994
30.65%

White
Women
1996
28.17%

White
Men
1994
27.83%

White
Men
1996
28.60%

Black
Women
1994
55.36%

Black
Women
1996
42.25%

Black
Men
1994
45.45%

Black
Men
1996
39.58%

Favor

73.94%

71.83%

72.17%

71.40%

44.64%

57.75%

54.55%

60.42%

Table 4: Opinion on Two-Year Limit Reform Opinion by Gender and Race (ANES)
TWO
YEAR
LIMIT
Oppose

White
Women
1994
21.68%

White
Women
1996
19.78%

White
Men
1994
18.06%

White
Men
1996
18.54%

Black
Women
1994
46.15%

Black
Women
1996
33.80%

Black
Men
1994
37.50%

Black
Men
1996
42.86%

Favor

78.32%

80.22%

81.94%

81.46%

53.85%

66.20%

62.50%

57.14%
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Table 5: Predictors of Change in Welfare Spending Preferences Over Time (ANES)
Variable
White Men

Odds Ratio
.74
(.14)
Black Women
.63
(.22)
Black Men
1.52
(.35)
News Consumption
1.21
(.22)
Cut 1
-4.09
(.37)
Cut 2
-1.65
(.19)
Cut 3
1.31
(.18)
Cut 4
3.83
(.34)
Ordered-Logistic Regression. Results in odds ratios. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
White women serve as the reference category. Higher values of the dependent variable represent
becoming more supportive of spending from 1994 to 1996. N=518.

Table 6: Predictors of Change in Thermometer Ratings Over Time (ANES)
Variable
White Men

Coefficient
1.96
(1.96)
Black Women
12.02***
(3.59)
Black Men
2.19
(4.65)
News Consumption
-1.88
(1.90)
Constant
-4.97
(1.82)
OLS Regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. White women serve as the reference
category. N=468. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*.
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Table 7: Predictors of Change in Child Cap Preferences Over Time (ANES)
Variable
White Men

Odds Ratio
1.23
(.27)
Black Women
.56
(.22)
Black Men
.85
(.44)
News Consumption
1.31
(.28)
Cut 1
-1.63
(.22)
Cut 2
2.07
(.23)
Ordered-Logistic Regression. Results in odds ratios. Standard errors shown in parentheses.
White women serve as the reference category. N=460.

Table 8: Predictors of Change in Two-Year Limit Preferences Over Time (ANES)
Variable
White Men

Odds Ratio
1.06
(.25)
Black Women
1.67
(.78)
Black Men
1.59
(.92)
News Consumption
.62**
(.15)
Cut 1
-2.30
(.25)
Cut 2
1.95
(.24)
Ordered-Logistic Regression. Results in odds ratios. Standard errors shown in parentheses.
White women serve as the reference category. N=467. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*.
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Appendix A
Table 9: Predictors of Preferences on Food Stamp Spending (1996 NBES)
Variable
Gender

Odds Ratio
.98
(.22)
Age
1.01
(.01)
Income
.99
(.12)
Party ID
1.08
(.10)
Ideology
.84
(.12)
Education
1.01
(.06)
Marital Status
.99
(.08)
Children
1.21
(.27)
Employment
.74
Status
(.20)
Religion
.98
(.16)
Newspaper
.95
(.04)
Cut 1
-1.13
(.78)
Cut 2
1.68
(.79)
Ordered-Logistic Regression. Preference on food stamp spending is the dependent
variable (1=increased, 2=kept about the same, 3=decreased). Results in odds
ratios. Standard Errors in parentheses. N=375.
Table 10: Predicted Probabilities of Preferring Decreased Food Stamp
Spending by Gender (1996 NBES)

Gender
Male
Female

Predicted Probability
.21
(.15—.28)
.22
(.17—.27)

Confidence interval in parentheses. All other variables are held are their means.
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Table 11: Predictors of Welfare Thermometer Ratings (1996 NBES)
Variable
Gender

Coefficient
.02
(2.79)
Age
-.06
(.12)
Income
-.74
(1.51)
Party ID
.85
(1.07)
Ideology
-1.87
(1.71)
Education
1.47
(.80)
Marital Status
-1.42
(1.04)
Children
-1.01
(2.83)
Employment Status
-9.99***
(3.41)
Religion
-2.62
(2.14)
Newspaper
-.70
(.16)
Constant
68.72
(9.92)
OLS Regression. N=353. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*.

Table 12: Predicted Values of Welfare Thermometer Ratings by Gender (1996 NBES)
Variable
Male

Predicted Value
52.31
(47.91—56.71)
Female
52.37
(49.17—55.57)
Confidence intervals in parentheses. All other variables are held at their means.
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Table 13: Predictors of Favoring Child Cap Reform (1996 NBES)
Variable
Gender
Age
Income
Party ID
Ideology
Education
Marital Status
Children
Employment
Status
Religion
Newspaper
Constant

Odds Ratio
1.57*
(.38)
1.01
(.01)
1.08
(.14)
1.60**
(.03)
1.17
(.17)
.98
(.07)
.85*
(.08)
.78
(.20)
1.30
(.39)
1.04
(.19)
1.07
(.05)
.37
(.32)

Logistic Regression. Results in odds ratios. N=347. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**,
P≤.10*.

Table 14: Predicted Probabilities of Favoring Child Cap Reform by Gender
(1996 NBES)
Variable Predicted Probability
Male
.52
(.42—.61)
Female
.60
(.53—.67)
All other variables are held at their means.
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Table 15: Predictors of Favoring the Five-Year Limit Reform (1996 NBES)
Variable

Odds Ratio

Gender

1.52*
(.39)
Age
.96***
(.01)
Income
1.10
(.15)
Party ID
1.43*
(.30)
Ideology
1.47**
(.24)
Education
.98
(.07)
Marital Status
.96
(.09)
Children
.47***
(.13)
Employment
.96
Status
(.31)
Religion
.62
(.13)
Newspaper
.95
(.04)
Constant
25.45
(24.48)
Logistic Regression. Results in odds ratios. N=366. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*.
Table 16: Predicted Probabilities of Favoring the Five-Year Limit Reform by Gender (1996
NBES)
Variable
Male

Predicted Probability
.67
(.58—.76)
Female
.75
(.69—.81)
Confidence intervals in parentheses. All other variables are held at their means.
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Table 17: Predictors of Believing that Poorness is Caused by Lack of Effort (1995 Kaiser
Foundation Survey)
Variable

Odds Ratio

White Women

2.91***
(1.24)
White Men
4.63***
(1.99)
Black Men
1.53
(.87)
Age
.97
(.05)
Income
1.09**
(.05)
Education
.88*
(.07)
Ideology
1.16
(.13)
Party ID
1.58***
(.16)
Welfare
1.03
(.19)
Constant
.25***
(.13)
Logistic Regression. Black women serve as reference category. Results in odds
ratios and standarderrors reported in parentheses. N=800. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**,
P≤.10*.
Table 18: Predicted Probabilities of Believing that Poorness is Caused by Black of Effort by
Race and Gender (1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable
White Women

Predicted Probability
.60
(.48—.71)
White Men
.65
(.54—.77)
Black Men
.46
(.16—.76)
Black Women
.54
(.24—.83)
Confidence interval in parentheses. All other variables are held at their means.
P≤0.01***,P≤.05**, P≤.10*.
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Table 19: Predictors of Believing that Government Spending on the Poor Is Too Little
(1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable

Odds Ratio

White Women

.82
(.30)
White Men
1.06
(.39)
Black Men
.30*
(.19)
Age
1.11**
(.06)
Income
1.04
(.04)
Education
.96
(.07)
Ideology
1.10
(.12)
Party Identification
1.13
(.11)
Get Welfare
1.64***
(.28)
Cut 1
1.13
(.46)
Cut 2
1.68
(.45)
Cut 3
3.52
(.47)
Ordered Logistic Regression. Black women serve as reference category. Results
in odds ratios and standard errors reported in parentheses.
N=830. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*.
Table 20: Predicted Probabilities of Believing that Government Spending on the Poor Is
Too Little (1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable
White Women

Predicted Probability
.69
(.59—.78)
White Men
.63
(.52—.73)
Black Men
.90
(.77—1.04)
Black Women
.71
(.40—1.03)
Confidence interval in parentheses. All other variables are held at their means.
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Table 21: Predictors of Believing that Women Having Children Is Not a Major Reason
People Are on Welfare (1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable

Odds Ratio

White Women

.48
(.23)
White Men
.41*
(.19)
Black Men
.15***
(.09)
Age
1.09
(.06)
Income
.99
(.04)
Education
.84**
(.06)
Ideology
1.16
(.13)
Party ID
1.02
(.10)
Welfare
1.03
(.19)
Cut 1
-3.72
(.56)
Cut 2
-1.54
(.56)
Ordered Logistic Regression. Black women serve as the reference category. Results in odds
ratios andstandard errors reported in parentheses. N=814. P≤0.01***, P≤.05**, P≤.10*.

Table 22: Predicted Probabilities of Believing that Women Having Children Is Not
a MajorReason People Are on Welfare (1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable Predicted Probability
White Women
.08
(.04—.12)
White Men
.09
(.04—.13)
Black Men
.26
(.04—.48)
Black Women
.07
(-.001—.02)
Confidence interval in parentheses. All other variables are held at their means.
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Table 23: Predictors of Believing that Welfare Encourages Women to Have Additional
Children (1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable

Odds Ratio

White Women

1.40
(.58)
White Men
1.49
(.62)
Black Men
.42
(.24)
Age
1.32***
(.09)
Income
1.11*
(.06)
Education
.68***
(.06)
Ideology
1.44***
(.19)
Party ID
1.34***
(.16)
Welfare
.49***
(.10)
Constant
1.27
(.25)
Logistic Regression. Black women serve as the reference category. Results in
odds ratios and standard errors reported in parentheses. N=754. P≤0.01***,
P≤.05**, P≤.10*.

Table 24: Predicted Probabilities of Believing that Welfare Encourages Women to Have
Additional Children (1995 Kaiser Foundation Survey)
Variable
White Women

Predicted Probability
.80
(.72—.88)
White Men
.81
(.73—.88)
Black Men
.58
(.32—.86)
Black Women
.89
(.77—1.00)
Confidence intervals in parentheses. All other variables are held at their means.
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Chapter 2
Just Say No: An Event History Analysis of the Diffusion of DrugTesting for Welfare Policies
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Introduction
In 2018, the Trump administration considered a plan which would permit states to require
mandatory drug-testing for recipients to receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) benefits. The policy would mandate testing for about 5% of SNAP recipients and
specifically target “able-bodied” people, those without dependents, and those who are seeking
jobs in specialized areas (Sanchez 2018). This would have been a sweeping change from current
federal law which prohibits states from mandating their own eligibility conditions for food
assistance (Sanchez 2018). However, federal law set by the 1996 welfare reform does grant
states the discretion to set eligibility requirements for welfare benefits and many states have used
this authority to pursue drug-testing requirements (Sanchez 2018).
Drug-testing for welfare policies have been proposed in nearly every state, a trend that
began following the 2008 economic recession (NCSL 2017; Ledford 2018). In 2009 alone, over
20 states considered proposals to make drug-testing a requirement of assistance (NCSL 2017).
Two states passed drug-testing legislation in 2009, one in 2010, two in 2011, three in 2012, one
in 2013, three in 2014, one in 2015, and one in 2016 for a total of 15 states with drug-testing for
welfare laws.23
[Table 1 about here]
I argue that these proposals and laws represent racially motivated efforts to restrict public
assistance eligibility. In that way, drug-testing laws are modern iterations of the government’s
legacy of neglecting and controlling Black Americans. Moreover, drug-testing laws perpetuate
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It should be noted that three states have passed multiple laws regarding drug-testing for welfare (Arizona,
Arkansas, and Georgia). For example, in 2015 Arkansas passed a law instituting a pilot program which drug-testing
welfare applicants. In 2017 the state passed a measure making the program permanent.
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the erroneous stereotype that most welfare recipients are deviant and undeserving of assistance
due to immoral behavior. In this case, the assumption is that a significant number of recipients of
public assistance are abusing drugs despitea1996 National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism study that found no statistically significant differences in levels of illegal drug use
between welfare recipients and non-welfare recipients (National Institutes of Health, 1996).
Evidence from states with drug-testing laws reinforces the NIAAA findings. Results from
seven states which require drug-tests for welfare applicants (Tennessee, Montana, Texas, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, and West Virginia) found that less than 1% of applicants tested positive
for drugs while, according to the National Survey of Drug Use and Health conducted by the
National Institute on Drug Abuse, about 10% of adult Americans are estimated to regularly use
illegal drugs (The Center for Law and Social Policy, 2015; National Institute on Drug Abuse,
2019). A prime example of the mismatch between perceptions and reality is Oklahoma, where in
2016 a little over 17,000 people applied for TANF benefits and 3,856 of which were given a
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory test (SASSI) in order to determine if there was a
“reasonable suspicion” of drug abuse (Covert and Israel 2017).24 About 1 in 3 of those screened
were ordered to undergo a drug test for benefits due to the results of the SASSI. However, less
than 9%, or 101 applicants tested positive (Covert and Israel 2017). While the cost of the
Oklahoma’s 2016 drug-testing program was $668,818.48, state officials decided to keep the
program (Covert and Israel 2017).
This chapter examines the factors that influence the diffusion of drug-testing for welfare
policies across states. More specifically, I test for how state-level racial variables affect the
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The SASSI Institute reports that the screening process has a 94% accuracy rate (Ellis 2013).
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proposal and passage of drug-testing legislation. While numerous studies have examined the
diffusion of welfare policies, including some that focus on racial factors, only one study has
evaluated drug-testing proposals, and none have studied drug-testing laws.
Literature Review
Various scholars have studied the diffusion of welfare policies. Volden (2006), examined
the diffusion of Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) policies, finding that states with
similar political characteristics were likely to emulate one another (Volden 2006, 302). He also
found that a 1% difference in minority population between states resulted in a 1% increase in the
odds that a state would adopt another’s CHIP policy (Volden 2006, 303). In their study of the
diffusion of work requirements, family caps, and time limits after the passage of PRWORA, Soss
et al. found that family caps and time limits were more likely in states with higher proportions of
Black and Latino AFDC recipients (2001, 386).
They also found that restrictive policies, were adopted at significantly higher rates in
states with the following characteristics: conservative governments, low party competition,
higher birth rates for unmarried women, smaller AFDC caseloads, and previous engagement in
policy innovations on welfare policy (Soss et al. 2001, 386). Additionally, strict sanctions were
more likely in states with a higher proportion of Black AFDC clients, while work requirements
were primarily influenced by increased incarceration rates and tighter labor markets (Soss et al.
2001, 386). The authors concluded that welfare policies were driven in large part by ideology
and race (Soss et al. 2001, 389).
Fellowes and Rowe (2004) examined the diffusion of TANF policies across states
between 1997 and 2000. The authors found that race plays an essential part in the diffusion of
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welfare policies across states (2004, 365). Their research shows that states populations that
included higher percentages of African Americans and Latinos were more likely to adopt stricter
eligibility policies, while those with a higher proportions of Blacks residents on welfare were
more likely to adopt harsher work requirements and lower levels of cash benefits (Fellowes and
Rowe 2004, 367-368).25
Fellowes and Rowe (2004) suggest that the effect of racial factors they observe in state
welfare policymaking can be explained by a combination of four types of pressures. The first is
constituent pressures. Put simply, this theory argues that as constituents become more favorable
toward welfare programs—or as the authors state, constituents are “more liberal, less racist, or
less class-biased”—state policymakers respond to this change by passing more liberal welfare
policies (Fellowes and Rowe 2001, 363). The opposite is also the case—when constituents
become less liberal, more racist, and more class-biased they pressure policymakers to implement
more restrictive welfare policies. Ledford (2018) finds something similar in his analysis of drugtesting for welfare laws.
The second type of pressure involves institutional factors like party control of
government and government ideology. As would be expected, the institutional pressure theory
posits that Democratically controlled governments and more liberal governments pass more
lenient welfare policies than those implemented by both Republican controlled governments and
conservative governments (Fellowes and Rowe 2004).

Fellowes and Rowe (2004) also find that high-income representation bias and slack resources at a state’s disposal
are predicted to result in harsher work requirements (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, 367). Liberal governments, numbers
of Democratic representatives in the statehouse, and greater total number of recipients in a state are predicted to lead
to more flexible work requirements (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, 367). High income representational bias, liberalism
in a state, slack resources, and larger overall numbers of recipients are predicted by the model to increase the value
of cash benefits in a state (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, 369). It should be noted that the value of cash benefits is the
only policy where the authors see an effect for geographic proximity (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, 369).
25
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Third, the authors explore paternalistic pressures in which governments attempt to
execute a moral agenda through various policies. According to this theory, more restrictive
policies may be enacted if policymakers observe an increase in “immoral” behavior (Fellowes
and Rowe 2004). In the case of drug-testing laws, the presumed immoral behavior would be
drug-use. Last, resource pressure argues that states with fewer financial resources will resort to
less generous welfare policies and that neighboring states will “race to the bottom” to avoid
attracting welfare recipients (Fellowes and Rowe).
Karch (2007) studies the causal mechanisms responsible for diffusion of time limits and
family caps in welfare policies across states. Along with establishing time limits, family caps,
and work requirements, PRWORA also granted substantially more discretion to states regarding
the formulation of welfare policymaking (Karch 2007, 15).26 Karch (2007) lists what he refers to
as the “usual suspects” of policy diffusion often noted in diffusion literature.27 However, he finds
little evidentiary support for these causal mechanisms (Karch 2007, 44). Wealth, or the slack
resources hypothesis, has a positive and significant effect on both time limits and family cap
policies (Karch 2007, 47). Finally, ideology is found to be significantly associated with time
limits and family caps are more likely to be enacted in conservative states (Karch 2007, 49).
Very little research has examined the diffusion of drug-testing laws across states, with the
exception of Ledford (2018) who found that the number of African American TANF recipients
and higher levels of state aggregate symbolic racism positively affected the likelihood of a state
proposing drug-testing laws for welfare. Ledford (2018) is not the first to make the connection
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Between 1993 and 1996 eighteen states adopted time limit policies (Karch 2007, 21). Similarly, twenty-three
states adopted family cap policies between 1992 and 1998 (Karch 2007, 22).
27
The author lists important internal correlates of diffusion in states: wealth, ideology, problem severity, and
geographic proximity, success of policy in other states, interstate competition, communication networks, and
legislative professionalism (Karch 2007, 41).
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between feelings of racial prejudice and the formation of welfare preferences (Gilens 1995,1999;
Peffley et al. 1997; Avery and Peffley 2003, etc.). The relationship between feelings of racial
resentment and more restrictive welfare policies relies on racial stereotypes suggesting that Black
people are irresponsible, lazy, and get more than they deserve (Ledford 2018, 513; Henry and
Sears 2002, 2003; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000).
While Ledford (2018) analyzed the effect of racial factors—including the racial
composition of TANF recipients, state Black populations, and levels of state symbolic racism—
on the propensity of states to propose drug-testing laws, he did not study these factors’ potential
effect on the actual passage of statutes. Moreover, Ledford’s analysis of data from 2008 to 2014
utilizes multi-level logistic models instead of event history analysis in order to keep states which
propose laws in the dataset instead of dropping them once they experience “failure” (i.e.
adoption). Ledford argues that since failure, in this case, does not mean that the event can never
occur again—unlike more traditional failures in EHA analysis such as death—states should not
be dropped from the model after experiencing an “event” (2018, 520).
Theory
Volden (2006) concludes that policy success, and therefore emulation, plays the most
significant role in policy diffusion of CHIP policies. The theoretical reasoning for this is
straightforward: the more successful a policy, the more likely that policy is to be adopted
elsewhere. However, this cannot be the main mechanism propelling the diffusion of drug testing
policies. For the most part, these policies have failed to achieve either of their stated goals—to
identify a substantial number of public assistance beneficiaries who use drugs and restrict them
from receiving benefits and, subsequently, to lower the overall costs of welfare programs in the
state. Despite the fact that drug-testing laws have failed to find a significant proportion of
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welfare applicants using drugs and the process of drug-testing applicants has proven to cost more
money than states are saving from eliminating drug-users from welfare rolls, states continue to
propose or pass such requirements. Therefore, there must be another mechanism or mechanisms
driving policy diffusion.
Soss et al. (2001) and Fellowes and Rowe (2004) find that race explains the diffusion of
welfare policies from state to state. Both studies conclude that the higher the percentage of Black
Americans receiving welfare in a state, the harder it is to qualify for assistance and the fewer
benefits recipients receive. Volden (2006) also finds that racial minority population matters for
the diffusion of CHIP policies (303). It is important to remember that the issue of drug use has
traditionally been publicly perceived as a racialized issue with media over-representing
minorities in coverage of drug use (Gilens 2003). For these reasons, I expect the number of
African Americans receiving welfare and the percentage of African Americans in a state to
positively effect that state’s likelihood of adopting drug-testing policies.
State legislators and policy makers are not impervious to the influence of racial
resentment and can rely on negative racial stereotypes to design policy (Ledford 2018, 515;
Ingram and Schneider 2005; Schneider and Sidney 2009). Moreover, scholars have noted that
while welfare recipients have negative social constructions, Black welfare recipients have an
even more negative construction. Many of the populations which are labeled deviant—welfare
mothers, poor people, and drug-users— are stereotypes associated with Black welfare recipients
(Schneider and Sidney 2009). For these reasons, I predict that states with higher levels of racial
resentment will be more likely to propose and adopt drug-testing policies.
Volden (2006) and Fellowes and Rowe (2004) both conclude that ideology also
influences a state’s likelihood of adoption. Conservative states and those with unified Republican
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control are more likely to enact punitive welfare policies which restrict eligibility—such as those
policies which mandate passing a drug test in order to receive assistance. Therefore, I expect that
states with high levels of conservatism and those with unified Republican party control of
government will be more likely to adopt drug-testing policies. As Gilardi (2010) suggests,
politicians preoccupied with reelection may be more concerned with the political success of a
policy rather than its effectiveness. Therefore, success, in the context of drug testing for welfare,
may not be categorized by policy success but rather by political success.
Since there is evidence that states compete in a race to the bottom, it may be that
neighboring states track the eligibility rules of nearby states. Yet, Volden (2006), Soss et al.
(2001), and Fellowes and Rowe (2004) do not find substantial effects of geographic proximity.
Therefore, I expect there will be some support for the geographic proximity hypothesis, but that
this will mostly be due to similarities in resources, demographics, and ideology. Relatedly, since
drug-testing policies were, for the most part, sold to the public as a means to reduce the cost of
social programs, I expect the economic characteristics of a state to affect the likelihood of it
adopting the policy.28 Moreover, I expect that states with higher levels of outstanding debt and
lower revenues will have a positive relationship to the proposal and adoption of drug-testing
policies than states with lower levels of debt and higher revenues.
Research Design
For the past two decades event history analysis (EHA) has been the traditional method of
studying diffusion of policies across states (Boehmke 2009, 229). EHA entails either a logistic or
probit analysis wherein the dependent variable is a state year binary variable representing
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Even though these policies have not achieved the policy goal of reducing costs, they can still be framed as an
effort to do so in other states.
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whether a state adopted a policy or not. In other words, the dependent variable in hazard models
has two parts, the event indicator variable, whether a state proposed/adopted drug-testing for
welfare, and a measure of time from the baseline time to the event. EHA is a type of pooled
cross-sectional time-series analysis which allows researchers to observe the effect of independent
variables that fluctuate every year (Karch 2007, 40). It can do so because EHA includes
longitudinal variation (Karch 2007, 40). When using this method, a state is included in the
analysis until the policy in question is adopted (Boehmke 2009, 231). After one state in the
model adopts a policy, all states in the model are classified as being at risk (Karch 2007, 205).
After a state adopts the policy, they are dropped from the model (Boehmke 2009, 231; Karch
2007, 205). Since the data are discrete-time data or indicating whether a proposal or law
occurred in a given year, I use the Cox Proportional Hazards Model.
I analyze both proposals and policy adoptions with a Cox Proportional Hazards Model.
Once a state adopts a drug-testing for welfare policy, all states in the model are at risk and that
state is dropped from the model. However, for the proposal model, I utilize an adapted Cox
Proportional Hazard Model for recurrent events with states clustered and robust standard errors.
This allows states to remain in the model even after their first proposal. By observing proposals
in addition to policy adoption, I will be able to better understand and track interest in the policy
and track the process of diffusion more deeply. There is reason to believe that looking at
proposals has explanatory utility. Hall (1998) explains how legislators have limited resources—
both limited time and limited money. Therefore, sponsoring/introducing a bill can be a good
indicator of policy priorities (Hall 1998).
I include variables in my analysis which represent the major theories of the mechanisms
that drive policy diffusion. I collected data for these variables for all fifty states for 2009-2018. I
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begin the analysis in 2009 as it was the first year a state adopted a drug-testing policy.
Theoretically, after the first passage year all other states become at risk of proposal and adoption.
The final year in the analysis is 2018—six states proposed drug-testing legislation in that year—
and it is the last year I have data for.
My dependent variable is a state year dummy variable for each year indicating whether a
state proposed/passed drug-testing for welfare (1) or did not (0) in that year. My main
independent variables of interest are the proportion of African American families receiving
TANF in a state, the percent of African Americans in a state population, and state-level estimates
of racial resentment.29 The racial resentment variable is extrapolated data from 2008, 2012 and
2016 state-level estimates of racial resentment taken from Smith et al. (2020). The authors use
linear multilevel regression with poststratification weighting (MRP) to connect three variables—
census data, ANES survey data measuring levels of racial resentment, and data on state-level
variables30 that are predicted to influence racial attitudes—to create state-level estimates of racial
resentment (Smith et al. 2020).
I also include variables which capture economic, regional, political, demographic, and
welfare related factors. State total revenue, total debt, per capita personal income, and
unemployment rates in states are included to account for economic influences on proposing or
passing drug-testing for welfare. Geographic proximity and a South dummy variable account for
regional factors, and average number of TANF recipients in a state, total population, estimates
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I also suspected that descriptive representation may be important to the likelihood of diffusion of drug-testing
policies and included an interpolated variable measuring the percentage of Black representatives in state legislatures
in the analysis. However, this variable was highly correlated with my main variables of interest—the proportion of
Black families on TANF (at .88) and the percentage of Blacks in a state’s population (at .94).
30
Variables include individual measures of race, age, education, state of residence, interaction for race and gender,
and a state-level variable measuring state ideology.
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for monthly illicit drug use in a state,31 and opioid deaths32 are the demographic factors in the
model. The geographic proximity variable is operationalized as the percentage of other states in
the same region as the state in question which have already adopted drug-testing policies. This
statistical proxy is commonly used to represent geographic proximity in diffusion research
(Berry and Berry 1990, 1992; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Haider-Markel 2001).
Finally, the political variables in the model are party control of state government and
government ideology. The party control variable measure whether the state government is
controlled by Democrats or Republicans while the state government ideology variable is Berry et
al.’s measure which accounts for yearly ideological scores for five state governmental actors: the
governor and the two major parties in both chambers of the state legislature (1998). The Berry et
al. data, updated to 2018, allows me to examine if state government wherein more conservative
governors and members of state legislatures are more likely to adopt or propose drug-testing for
welfare policies.
I expect that measure of state government ideology may potentially be correlated to other
variables in the analysis such as the other political variable, control of government, as well as
total revenues, and the South region measure. If so, this would result in multicollinearity and
could affect the relative significance of the correlated variables as well as enlarge the confidence
intervals in the analysis.
I calculated the correlation between the government ideology measure and the region
variable, total revenues, and total population and all were below reasonably low levels. State
This variable is an estimate of the percentage of a state’s population (taken from the Census Bureau) divided by
the US Department of Health and Human Services’ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s
state estimates of illicit drug use of people 18 and older in the past month.
32
This variable is an estimate of the age-adjusted opioid overdose death rate per 100,000 of states from Kaiser
Family Foundation.
31
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ideology and control of government, however, were highly correlated at .80, indicating that
multicollinearity may be a problem. Yet, Cronbach’s Alpha between party control of government
and state government ideology was not sufficiently high to justify combining the variables. It
should be noted that while the party control of government and state government ideology
variables capture similar concepts, they are distinct. The former simply notes which party holds
the governorship and is the majority in the state legislature while the latter accounts for the
ideological distribution within state governmental actors.
Results
Testing Assumptions
Because my analysis uses a Cox proportional hazard model, I test that my covariates do
not violate the assumptions of this method. In order to test for proportionality, I examined the
continuous and categorical variables in the drug-testing proposal and drug-testing law models
with Schoenfeld residuals tests. All but one of the covariates in both models had insignificant pvalues, which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variables are not proportional.
I used Martingale residuals to examine nonlinearity by plotting these residuals against the
continuous variables included in the model. Once again, all variables but one was approximately
linear. Finally, I used deviance residuals to examine influential observations. While there are
some moderate outliers, this is not unexpected due to the political nature of the data being
examined. The one predictor which violated the proportional hazard assumption was the control
of government variable. Therefore, I analyze two models for both adoptions and proposals—one
including control of government as is and the other including control of government as an
interaction with time.
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Drug-Testing Laws Model 1
As shown in Table 2, none of the racial variables—the percentage of Blacks in a state’s
population, the proportion of Blacks receiving TANF, and the state-level estimate of racial
resentment—have a significant effect on the rate of adoption of state drug-testing laws in Model
1. Only two variables are significant in Model 1—government ideology and illicit drug use
estimates. The state ideology measure has a negative and significant relationship with adoption
rates. As states become one unit more liberal, the predicted rate of adoption decreases by 85%
(p≤.10). This suggests, as expected, that conservative states are more likely to adopt drug-testing
legislation. Lastly, the estimated percentage of illicit drug use in a state has a significant effect on
the adoption of drug-testing laws (p≤.05). As the percentage of estimated illicit drug use in a
state increases one percent, the predicted rate of adoption increases by 167%.
[Table 2 and Figure 1 about here]
Drug-Testing Laws Model 2
In Model 2, which includes the control of government variable interacted with time, the
racial variables remain insignificant. The interaction between control of government and time is
significant at the p≤.10, indicating that the positive effect of Republican control decreases
somewhat as time passes. Estimates of illicit drug use remains significant at the p≤.05 level. For
every one percent increase in the estimate of state illicit drug use, the predicted rate of adoption
increases by 160%
[Figure 2 and Table 3 about here]
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Drug-Testing Proposals Model 1
Table 3 shows the results of the adapted Cox Proportional Hazards model for state
proposals, as opposed to adoptions. Model 1 finds that for every for every one standard deviation
increase in the state-level estimate of racial resentment, the hazard ratio is expected to change by
a factor of 2.34 (p≤.01). The average number of TANF recipients in the state is found to have a
significant and negative relationship to the rate of proposals—for every additional percentage of
TANF recipients that are Black, the predicted rate of proposal decreases by 23%.
The economic variable of per capita personal income significantly decreases the
likelihood of proposal. For every dollar increase in per capita income in a state, the rate of
proposal decreases by 28% (p≤.05). Unemployment rates have a positive and significant effect
on proposals. For every one percent increase in a state’s unemployment rate, the predicted rate of
proposal increases by 73% (p≤.01). The only political variable that has a significant influence on
proposal rates is government ideology. As states become increasingly liberal, the rate of proposal
increases by 77% (p≤.10). I theorize that this is because conservative states are more likely to
actually adopt drug-testing laws so are less likely to have to repeatedly propose these laws.
Both of the estimates related to drug use, illicit drug use estimates and opioid overdose
death rates, are significant in Model 1. The higher the percentage of estimated illicit drug users in
a state, the higher the hazard of a state proposing a law (p≤.05). However, as more people die of
opioid overdoses, the hazard of failure decreases (p≤.01). For every one percent increase in
opioid overdoses the rate of proposal decreases by 36% while for every one percent increase in
illicit drug use estimates, the rate of proposal increases by 18%.

85

Why this difference regarding drugs and the likelihood to propose drug-testing laws? It
may be due to racial disparities between those who use opioids. Of the 64,070 people who died
of opioid overdoses in 2016, 79% were White (Santoro and Santoro 2018). In short, opioid use is
in fact—and importantly perceived to be—an overwhelmingly White problem. Furthermore,
media coverage of White opioid addicts is categorically different from that of Black addicts.
Netherland and Hansen (2017) conduct a content analysis of press articles between 2001
and 2011 to examine the differences in coverage of White non-medical opioid users and minority
heroin users. The authors find that media portrayals were consistently more sympathetic toward
White opioid users than minority heroin addicts. The authors describe this distinction as
reminiscent of the distinction made in the 1980s and 1990s between crack cocaine (a “Black
drug”) and powder cocaine (a “White drug”) (Netherland and Hansen 2017). In may be that
because White opioid users are perceived as being more sympathetic, they are therefore seen to
be more deserving of help than Black drug users.
Finally, geographic proximity significantly decreases the hazard rate. The more states in
the region that have adopted drug-testing laws, the less likely a state is to propose a drug-testing
law (p≤.01). As the percentage of states that have adopted drug-testing laws increases by 42%,
the rate of proposal decreases by 3%. This could be explained in a variety of ways. First, it could
be due to the various legal challenges state drug-testing laws have faced.33 These legal
difficulties could discourage neighboring states’ efforts to adopt similar legislation. Second, this
phenomenon could be explained by the failure of drug-testing laws to accomplish their stated
goals—to find a significant number of drug-using welfare recipients and to reduce government

An example is Florida’s 2011 law which was blocked by federal courts and later ruled unconstitutional by the
11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
33
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spending. Failing to accomplish these policy objectives may make neighboring state reluctant to
propose drug-testing legislation.
Drug-Testing Proposals Model 2
The results in Model 2 indicate that states with higher estimates of aggregate racial
resentment are more likely to propose drug-testing laws. For every one standard deviation
increase in the state racial resentment variable, the hazard ratio of proposal increases by a factor
of 2.17 (p≤.01). Unemployment remains significant in Model 2 with every one percent increase
in state unemployment the predicted proposal rate increases by 47% (p≤.10). Government
ideology also remains significant in Model 2. As state governments become one unit more
liberal, the predicted rate of proposal increases by 82% (p≤.01). While the interaction between
control of government and time is not significant, the control of government variable indicates
that there is a positive relationship between party control and the rate of proposal (p≤.01).
Moving from Democratic control to Republican control increases the rate of proposal by 421%.
Both drug variables remain significant in Model 2. As in Model 1, for every one percent
increase in the estimated illicit drug use the predicted rate of proposal increases by 19% (p≤.05)
The variable capturing opioid overdose deaths is significant in the racial resentment model—for
every one percent increase in opioids deaths, the proposal rate decreases by 32% (p≤.01).
Finally, geographic proximity’s direction and significance did not change from Model 1 to
Model 2—for every one unit increase in geographic proximity the proposal rate decreases by
35% (p≤.01).
[Table 3 and Figures 3 & 4 about here]
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Discussion
While the proportion of Black families on TANF and percentage of Blacks in a state do
not significantly increase the likelihood of proposal or adoptions, I still find evidence that race
plays an important role in the diffusion of drug-testing laws. The association between state-level
estimates of racial resentment and predicted rates of proposal in both Model 1 and Model 2 are
substantively large and statistically significant. The results associated with the illicit drug use and
opioid overdose deaths also suggest that race is an important factor for both adoption and
proposal. Estimates of illicit drug use significantly increase the rate of adoption and proposal in
every model. In contrast, opioid overdose deaths significantly decrease the rate of proposals in
both Models 1 and 2.
In both policy adoption models, government ideology is associated with a significant and
negative change in the likelihood of drug-testing for welfare laws. According to these results, as
a state government’s ideology becomes more liberal, it is less likely to pass drug-testing laws. It
is interesting to note that some provisions of state drug-testing laws may be inspired by the
conservative non-profit American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) (Oxford 2013). For
example, State Senator Thomas Williams (R-TX), who sponsored a 2013 drug-testing proposal
in Texas, is a member of ALEC (Oxford 2013). Moreover, Williams’ proposed legislation was
similar to Florida’s 2011 drug-testing law—which was later ruled unconstitutional—which was
partially based on model legislation from ALEC (Oxford 2013).
However, proposals of drug-testing laws are more likely to occur in states with liberal
governments in both Model 1 and Model 2. I believe that proposals are more likely in states with
liberal governments than in states with conservative governments because adoption rarely occurs
in states with more liberal governments, but Republican state legislators in such states repeatedly
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propose drug-testing in spite of this. In more conservative states, adoption is more likely, and
hence there are fewer opportunities to propose bills repeatedly. While I intend to collect data on
the party identification of every sponsor and co-sponsor of the proposals in the data, for now I
find some support for this theory in data collected for three states: Illinois, New York, and
Massachusetts.
For example, the state with the most proposal years in the sample data is Illinois, in
which a drug-testing bill was proposed every year from 2009 to 2018. Illinois is the seventh most
liberal state according to the state government ideology variable. For six of the ten years, there
were multiple bills proposed—in both 2015 and 2017 seven individual drug-testing for public
assistance bills were introduced in the state legislature. Of the 28 legislators who were sponsors
or co-sponsors for the total of 33 proposals between 2009 and 2018, 25 were Republicans and
three were Democrats.
The state of New York—which ranks amongst the eleven most liberal states according to
the Berry et al. measure of government ideology—saw proposals of legislation requiring drugtesting for public assistance in eight of the ten years in the analysis, the second highest number of
years in the sample. For five of those years, multiple bills relating to drug-testing for public
assistance were introduced, for a total of 21 bills. Of the 43 total state legislators who sponsored
or co-sponsored drug-testing bills in New York between 2009 to 2018, 98.71% were Republican
and 1.30% were Democratic.
Finally, Massachusetts, the most liberal of the fifty states from 2009 to 2018 according to
the Berry et al. measure of state government ideology, had drug-testing for public assistance
policies introduced in five of the ten years in the sample. Of the 24 state legislators who either
sponsored or co-sponsored such legislation, 70.83% were Republicans and 29.17% were
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Democrats. The results from these three states indicate that over 70% of sponsors and cosponsors on legislation relating to drug-testing for public assistance in Illinois, New York, and
Massachusetts, liberal states with a higher number of proposal years in the sample, were
members of the Republican Party. This supports the idea that Republican state legislators
repeatedly proposing drug-testing legislation in liberal is the explanation for why I find that
liberal states government are significantly more likely than their conservative counterparts to
propose drug-testing laws.
The economic variable of state unemployment rates has a positive and significant
relationship with drug-testing proposals in both Model 1 and Model 2. I theorize that this is due
efforts on behalf of state governments to restrict welfare eligibility in times of economic
hardship to reduce government spending. This theory is also somewhat supported by the results
in the proposal Model 1 in which higher per capita incomes have a significant negative effect on
the rate of proposals. Finally, the regional variable of geographic proximity is significant in both
Model 1 and Model 2 for drug-testing bill proposals. States surrounded by states that have
adopted drug-testing policies are significantly less likely to propose similar legislation.
In short, a combination of racial, drug-related, economic, and political factors were the
most important influences on the likelihood of states passing laws to drug-test welfare recipients.
When it comes to the likelihood of proposals racial, economic, political, geographic, and drugrelated factors were the most prominent influences. The fact that race was found to be a
significant factor for both adoption and proposals supports the overall argument of this
dissertation: that race remains an important influence on the development of modern welfare
policies in the United States. However, there is much more to examine regarding drug-testing for
welfare. My future research on this topic will include content analysis of debate and news
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coverage of these laws and proposals as well as studying the differences of the content of these
bills and laws such as the severity of punishment for failing a drug-test and which particular
welfare program is targeted.
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Table 1: Adoption of State Drug-Testing by Year
YEAR OF
PASSAGE
2009
2010
2011
2012

2013
2014

2015
2016

STATE(S)
Arizona
-Florida
Missouri
Georgia
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Utah
Kansas
North Carolina
Mississippi
Alabama
Michigan
Wisconsin
Arkansas
West Virginia
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Table 2: Factors Assocaited with the Adoption of State Drug-Testing Laws
Variable

Model 1
Hazard Ratio
.36
(.45)
3.42
(4.39)
3.42
(2.43)
.23
(.30)
38.94
(103.73)
.31
(.64)
3.92
(3.51)
.14
(2.43)
--

Model 2
Hazard Ratio
Percent Black Population
.30
(.34)
TANF Black
4.21
(4.87)
State-Level Racial
2.37
Resentment
(1.68)
Per Capita Income
.25
(.27)
Total Revenue
17.85
(45.17)
Total Debt
.31
(.61)
Unemployment
2.39
(2.23)
Avg. Number of TANF
.20
Recips/Month
(.42)
Control Government x Time
.49*
(.21)
Control Government
.77
15.49
(.82)
(45.40)
Government Ideology
.15*
.20
(.16)
(.21)
Total Population
.14
.25
(.30)
(.54)
Drug Use Estimates
2.67**
2.60**
(1.06)
(1.07)
Opioid Deaths
1.08
.93
(.40)
(.35)
South
1.14
1.19
(1.57)
(1.65)
Geographic Proximity
.57
.61
(.32)
(.35)
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Number of failures: 15. N=340.
Significance levels:
***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
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Table 3: Factors Associated with Drug-Testing Proposals
Variable

Model 1
Hazard Ratio
1.57
(.65)
.74
(.26)
2.34***
(.51)
.72**
(.11)
.68
(.43)
1.34
(.49)
1.73***
(.35)
.77**
(.10)
--

Model 2
Hazard Ratio
Percent Black Population
1.24
(.42)
TANF Black
.90
(.29)
State-Level Racial
2.17***
Resentment
(.42)
Per Capita Income
.69
(.10)
Total Revenue
.58
(.40)
Total Debt
1.52
(.54)
Unemployment
1.47*
(.30)
Avg. Number of TANF
.79
Recips/Month
(.14)
Control Government x Time
.71
(.06)
Control Government
1.09**
5.21***
(.17)
(3.03)
Government Ideology
1.73**
1.82***
(.42)
(.41)
Total Population
1.44
1.46
(.57)
(.62)
Drug Use Estimates
1.18**
1.19**
(.09)
(.10)
Opioid Deaths
.64***
.68***
(.11)
(.33)
South
.60
.69
(.30)
(.33)
Geographic Proximity
.58***
.65***
(.09)
(.11)
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Number of failures: 123. N=340.
Significance levels:
***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
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Chapter 3
Effect of an Experimental Survey on Blacks’ and Conservatives’
Preferences on Drug-Testing
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Introduction
With a few notable exceptions, "[v]irtually all racial priming research has examined the
public opinion of Whites…" (Chong and Junn 2011). Research on the effect of racial priming on
members of minority groups is an area of study that deserves scholarly attention. Specifically,
there is room to expand on how implicit and explicit racial messages activate, or fail to activate,
racial identification and considerations in minority-group members. One of the aims of this
chapter is to contribute to the limited literature concerning the potentially differing effects of
racial messages on White and Black Americans.
Another goal is to contribute to the enduring debate regarding whether the traditional racial
resentment scale measures feelings of prejudice or is simply a reflection of conservative
principles. By employing novel framing techniques, the experiment seeks to provide
conservative respondents with a redistribute policy they are likely to support rather than one they
would be likely to oppose. The experiment also draws on White's (2007) research, which uses
two types of implicit racial cues: implicit marginal and non-marginal racial cues. The utilization
of these distinct cues allows us to observe how references to marginal elements of the Black
community potentially affect Black respondents' policy preferences. Will exposure to implicit
racial cues in a fabricated news story that refer to marginal elements of the Black community
cause Black respondents to abandon feelings of linked fate and become more supportive of drugtesting policies while implicit racial cues that refer to non-marginal elements cause Black
subjects to activate feelings of racial resentment and become less supportive of drug-testing
policies?
As for conservative respondents, will priming fiscal conservatism or concerns about
infringements on personal liberties in a fabricated news story about drug-testing for welfare laws
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cause them to become less supportive of the policy? If so, this would suggest that conservatives
are primarily motivated by conservative principles. However, if when they are exposed to
implicit racial cues in the fabricated news story alongside the fiscal and legal frames,
conservatives become more supportive of drug-testing policies, this suggests conservative
support of the policies is primarily motivated by racial prejudice.
While few studies focus on the effects of racial messages on racial groups, there is a broader
body of scholarship examining how implicit and explicit racial cues affect Whites' attitudes and
preferences. Despite the considerable number of studies along those lines, there remains an
unresolved debate relating to the causes of Whites' disapproval of "racial" policies. Some
scholars argue that such preferences develop due to racially-neutral conservative principles
(Sears and Henry 2003; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, etc.) while
others maintain they instead stem from racial prejudice and resentment (Rabinowitz et al. 2009;
Reyna et al. 2005; Feldman and Huddy 2005, etc.). My use of new and unique framing
techniques in an experimental survey attempts to determine the relative importance of factors
that fuel White opposition to welfare policies and how variation in implicit racial frames
influences the preferences of Blacks.
Literature Review
As previously stated, there are comparatively few studies focusing on the impact of racial
priming on the targeted population itself.34 This chapter draws most heavily from one such
endeavor—White (2007). White conducts two survey experiments to evaluate the consequences

34

It should be noted that several studies have focused on the consequences of Black feelings of racial resentment
(Bobo and Johnson 2004; Buckler et al. 2009; Orey et al. 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010).

105

of racial messages on Black respondents. In the second experiment, respondents are presented
with a fabricated news story about welfare.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: no racial cue, explicit racial
cue, "inner-city" cue or "poor Americans" cue (White 2007). The use of two different types of
implicit cues—“inner-city” and “poor Americans” is fundamental in understanding whether
Black responses to implicit racial messages are conditional on that specific group or population
that the cue is referencing. The "inner-city" implicit appeal is intended to evoke images of
elements commonly perceived as "marginal" element by members of the Black community, such
as those living in ghettos and criminals and, therefore, fails to successfully prime racial
identification in Black respondents. However, the "poor Americans" implicit appeal does not
refer to any group that is commonly negatively perceived within the Black community, and as
such it activates Black respondents' sense of racial identification.35
The marginal implicit appeal (“inner-city”) failed to yield any significant change in Black
respondent's use of racial attitudes in formulating their preferences toward food stamp spending
while the non-marginal implicit cue (“poor Americans”) resulted in a positive and significant
change in Blacks’ racial group identification (White 2007). This difference suggests that Blacks
assigned the non-marginal cue were more likely than those assigned the marginal implicit cue to
consider racial attitudes in determining their levels of support for food stamp spending (White
2007).
Numerous studies have examined the impact racial priming has on the opinions of Whites.
Gilens (1996) concluded that racial attitudes substantially influenced White support for and

35

A more in-depth discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of White's (2007) research is provided in Chapter 1.

106

opposition to welfare. Experimental survey results from Peffley et al. (1997) found that racially
prejudiced White respondents were significantly more likely to negatively perceive African
Americans than similarly described Whites in the policy areas of welfare and crime. Conversely,
respondents who rejected Blacks' negative stereotypes were consistent in their views of welfare
recipients and criminal suspects regardless of race or individuating information regarding the
target (Peffley et al. 1997).
Reyna et al. (2005) found that conservatives oppose affirmative action policies more when
they target Black Americans than when they target women—nearly 9% of the variance in
opposition to affirmative action was explained by the change of the word "Blacks" to "women"
in the question. Wilson et al. (2014) examined the effect of Black imagery on opinions toward
voter identification laws, finding that the use of Black images, but not White images, alongside
the question regarding respondent support for voter identification laws increased support for
voter identification laws (Wilson et al. 2014).
Cassese et al. (2015) embedded a survey experiment utilizing racial cues in a question
concerning fair-pay policies in the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The
authors explain that opinions about race are interlinked with attitudes about gender due to their
shared origins (Cassese et al. 2015, 5). Under the experiment, respondents were randomly
assigned to one of three versions of a question about fair pay for women which included
information on the wage disparities between African American or Hispanic women and men
(Cassese et al. 2015, 10). In the analysis, which incorporated both the racial resentment scale and
the modern sexism index, the authors found that levels of support for fair-pay policies among
liberals and moderates under each experimental condition vary based on the respondent's level of
racial resentment (Cassese et al. 2015, 11-14).
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For White liberals and moderates, the African American women's treatment primed feelings
of racial resentment and, in turn, lowered support for fair-pay policies (Cassese et al. 2015, 14).
However, the use of racial cues failed to significantly affect conservative support for fair-pay
policies (Cassese et al. 2015, 17). Modern sexism's effect on men's attitudes toward the payequity policy was negative and relatively constant across ideologies (Cassese et al. 2015, 17).
However, the effect of modern sexism on women's attitudes displayed greater variation and was
more dependent on ideology (Cassese et al. 2015, 17).
The Puzzle of Measuring Racial Resentment
For decades, the standard method of measuring racial resentment has been the racial
resentment scale first developed by Kinder and Sanders for the American National Election
Study (ANES) in the mid-1980s. While this symbolic racism scale is the dominant measure of
feelings of racial resentment, it is not without criticism. Feldman and Huddy (2009) argued that
the field's emphasis on symbolic or implicit racism directs too much attention away from explicit
racism. Some scholars have argued that Kinder and Sander’s scale does not effectively isolate
racial prejudice and also taps conservative attitudes ostensibly unrelated to race include
respondents’ attitudes regarding government and redistributive policies (Kinder 1986; Feldman
and Huddy 2005; Zigerell 2015, etc.). The fact that the racial resentment scale may in part
measure race-neutral conservatism increases the difficulty of determining whether it is raceneutral conservative principles or attitudes of racial prejudice which are the primary reason for
behind opposition to policies designed to aid racial minorities. Respondents who rank high on
the racial resentment scale can potentially be categorically racist or categorically conservative
(Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Sniderman and Carmines 1997).
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Among those who argue that the extent to which the scale captures ostensibly race-neutral
conservativism limits its effectiveness in the analysis are DeSante and Smith (2020). The authors
argue that the way in which racial resentment is currently measures confounds racial prejudice
and conservative principles (DeSante and Smith 2020). Moreover, DeSante and Smith (2020,
639) argue that scholars' over-reliance on the current racial resentment scale has resulted in a
one-dimensional understanding of White Americans' racial attitudes. Using this measure of racial
resentment suggests that people’s racial attitudes have been static for decades (DeSante and
Smith 2020, 639). However, we know this is not the case (Schuman et al. 1999; DeSante and
Smith 2020a; 2020b). DeSante and Smith contend that the classic racial resentment scale
assumes that racial attitudes are characterized by only one emotion—resentment (2020, 640).
Such an operationalization of prejudice ignores research that suggests that racial attitudes stem
from a range of emotions such as "anger, apathy, guilt, fear, and empathy" (DeSante and Smith
2020, 640; Banks and Valentino 2012).
DeSante and Smith (2020) attempted to overcome the shortcomings of the dominant racial
resentment measure by analyzing four different racial attitudes scales,36 each of which captures
different dimension of racial prejudice. All four scales were included in a 2014 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) and were analyzed to determine which combination of
items maximized R-squared. The resulting measure of racial attitudes is the Fear,
(acknowledgment of) Institutional Racism, and Racial Empathy (FIRE) battery, which is
composed of four Likert questions.37 The authors maintain that their scale is as predictive, and in

36

Neville et al.'s (2000) Colorblind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS), Spainerman and Heppner's (2004) PsychoSocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW), Wilson and Davis' (2011) Explicit Racism Resentment Scale (EXR),
and Kinder and Sander's (1986) Racial Resentment Scale.
37
Scale questions: I am fearful of other races.; White people in the US have certain advantages because of the color
of their skin.; Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations.; I am angry that racism exists.
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some cases even more predictive, of White respondents’ preferences than the traditional racial
resentment scale (DeSante and Smith 2020).
It is important to note that the traditional concept of racial resentment, as measured by the
Kinder and Sander’s scale, has been shown to significantly affect political preferences,
including, but not limited to, evaluations of presidents Obama and Trump (Tesler and Sears
2010; Tesler 2016; Berinsky et al. 2011; Tien 2017; Setzler and Yanus 2018; Sides et al. 2018),
certain policy preferences such as opinions regarding gun control (Filindra and Kaplan 2016;
Filindra and Kaplan 2017), the death penalty, and the use of police force (Carter and Corra 2016;
Cramer 2020, 156). Moreover, as noted by Cramer (2020, 155) racial resentment is related to the
political behavior of White Americans including—participation in Tea Party activities (Tope et
al. 2015), voting in congressional elections (Petrow 2010), and willingness to contact one's
member of Congress in regards to policies that benefit minorities to name a few (Cramer 2020,
156). Some evidence also suggests that racial resentment has become even more important in the
post-Obama era (Tesler 2013; Cramer 2020, 155).38
Principles or Prejudice?
Traditionally, survey experiments that have attempted to determine whether racial policy
opposition stems from racial prejudice or race-neutral conservative principles have utilized
various frames on race-related policies that conservatives are predisposed to oppose. For
example, Feldman and Huddy (2005) examine preferences toward affirmative actions and
Cassese et al. (2015) examine fair-pay policies. These are policies that tap into conservative's
support of individualism and limited government.

38

Evidence suggests that racial resentment is less dominant among younger Americans (Cramer 2020, 155).
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Feldman and Huddy (2005) attempted to determine whether it is race-neutral conservative
principles or racism that explains White opposition toward race-related policies. To do so, the
authors conducted an experiment wherein respondents are questioned about their support for
scholarship programs that either target African American or White students (Feldman and Huddy
2005). Overall, respondents expressed support for the scholarship program regardless of whether
it focused on White or Black students (Feldman and Huddy 2005, 173). That changed, however,
when the treatment included a class component. Respondents were more supportive of the
program if it targeted middle-class Whites rather than middle-class Black students (Feldman and
Huddy 2005, 173). Furthermore, the authors found that respondents were also more supportive of
scholarship programs for poor White than poor Black students (Feldman and Huddy 2005). The
authors also conducted a separate analysis to examine differences based on ideology. Feldman
and Huddy found that racial resentment among liberals decreases support for the scholarship
program for poor and middle-class Black students (2005, 176). Conservatives with low levels of
racial resentment supported the program for low-income Blacks and Whites of any class
(Feldman and Huddy 2005, 176).
Kam and Burge (2019) found that Kinder and Sander’s (1996) racial resentment scale
correlates with racial resentment among Whites but not among Blacks. The authors discussed
how other scholars argue that ideological identification may work differently for Blacks and
Whites (Kam and Burge 2019, 15). For example, Philpot (2017) explained that Black ideological
identification is based on attitudes concerning social welfare and religion while White
ideological identification is based on attitudes about social welfare, religion, morality, and
limited government (Kam and Burge 2019, 15).
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Since my research involves policies that reference criminal behavior—the use of illegal
drugs—it is also useful to discuss research that examines the effect of racial stereotypes and
prejudice on preferences of punitive criminal justice policies. There is an extensive body of
research that shows the relationship between feelings of racial prejudice and White preferences
about more punitive crime policies including support for the death penalty and police use of
force, and harsher sentencing (Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Peffley et al. 2017; Carter and Corra
2016; Morris and LeCount 2020, 3). Why does this linkage between racial attitudes and White’s
preferences on harsher criminal policies exist?
One possible explanation is that White’s attitudes are influenced by racial stereotypes and
media representations as well as the disproportionate percentage of Blacks in the criminal justice
system (Morris and LeCount 2020, 4). Blacks are so often stereotyped as criminals that the
phrase “criminal predator” has become synonymous for “young Black male” (Welch 2007).
Such stereotypes that unfairly associate being Black with criminal behavior in the United States
can be traced back to slavery (Kennedy 1997; Welch 2007, 276). Moreover, these stereotypes
have developed over time and it was during the 1970s and 1980s that the stereotype of the young
Black man evolved from “petty thief or rapist into that of an ominous criminal predator” (Welch
2007, 276-277).
Black Americans are also frequently associated with drug use in the minds of White
Americans. According to a study by Sigelman and Tuch (1996), White Americans are more
likely to believe Blacks, more than any other racial group, abuse drugs and commit crimes even
though national research has shown that most racial groups use illegal drugs at approximately
similar rates or at lower rates than Whites (Welch 2007, 278-279; Katz 2000). The war on drugs
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of the 1980s did little to dispel these beliefs since it unduly targeted Black Americans and Blacks
are disproportionately arrested and convicted for drug offenses (Austin and Irwin 2001; Mauer
1999; Reiman 1998; Tonry 1995; Welch 2007). These factors have solidified the connection
between Blacks and drug use in the mind of many Americans.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the recent opioid epidemic in America is widely
perceived as being a White drug problem and opioid users may be seen as being sympathetic
than Black drug users (Netherland and Hansen 2017). This may result survey respondents
expressing higher levels of support for drug-testing laws under experimental treatments that
implicitly or explicitly refer to racial minorities while treatments that do not include references to
racial groups result in lower levels of support.
Research has also examined how feelings of racial resentment influence Black Americans’
opinions on public policies. Kam and Burge (2018) found that Black subjects who score low on
the traditional racial resentment scale were likely to agree with institutional explanations for
racial inequality while those who scored higher were likely to believe that inequality could be
explained by “group based differences in temperament and effort” (Kam and Burge 2019, 3).
Analyzing variation across the resentment scale among Black respondents, Kam and Burge
(2019) found that Blacks who were racially resentful were likely to oppose racially liberal public
policies, while Blacks who were not racially resentful supported racially liberal policies (15).
Theory
Currently, fifteen American states have some form of drug testing for welfare recipients.
Moreover, nearly every state has proposed such a law. These policies require applicants and/or
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recipients of welfare programs to pass drug-tests as a stipulation of receiving aid.39 These laws
have been popular in states with Republican state legislatures and, in theory, appealed to
conservative principles of limited government spending and punitive welfare policies. However,
these policies can also be framed in two ways to negate their appeal to conservatives: as a waste
of government/taxpayer money and as government infringement on personal liberty.43 In other
words, drug-testing policies confront conservatives with competing ideological considerations.
By emphasizing certain considerations, I can determine when conservatives are willing to oppose
such policies.
The experiment to determine the primary mechanism driving support for drug-testing for
welfare benefits—racial attitudes or race-neutral conservative ideals—advances the literature in a
few ways. Experiments that have attempted to determine whether ideology or racial attitudes fuel
opposition to welfare policies to a greater extent have faced complications since conservatives
are inherently opposed to the policy in question. The case of drug-testing for TANF is an
interesting one to examine. Traditionally, we would expect conservatives to support policies that
seek to restrict welfare benefits, regardless of the race of the respondents. While drug-testing
policies were sold to the public as having the potential to decrease government spending on
welfare, these programs have actually led to increased spending. As discussed in Chapter 2,
while conservative and Republican officials championed drug-testing policies as a new way to
save the government money by withholding aid from undeserving drug users, in practice, these
laws have cost state governments more than they have saved (Covert and Israel 2017).

39

These programs have more recently transitioned from originally screening all applicants/recipients to screening
only those they believe have a "reasonable suspicion" of using drugs.
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By appealing to conservative's interest in reduced government spending, I can more
adequately examine if conservatives are willing to overlook fiscal concerns to support a drugtesting for welfare policy. If they are, it would suggest that their support of drug-testing policies
stem from racial prejudice rather than race-neutral conservatism. Moreover, there are aspects of
individual freedom involved in these laws. Several state courts have determined that suspicionless drug tests for welfare recipients are unconstitutional (Randi 2016). For example, the US
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Florida's suspicion-less testing policy violated the
4th Amendment in 2014 (Randi 2016, 1). Conservatives adhere to a general philosophy of
maximum individual freedom and limited government intervention—two things which drugtesting for welfare laws would appear to violate.
The survey randomly assigns subjects to either a weather forecast (the control) or a fabricated
news story. The fabrication presents the issue of drug-testing through two possible frames: a
legal/civil liberties frame and a fiscal frame. The first frame states that these laws have often
been the subject of legal challenges and have been found to violate applicant's constitutional
rights, while the second states that the laws have cost states money rather than saving money as
was predicted by legislators.
As Nelson et al. (1997) explain, media framing has significant effects on how people
comprehend and establish their preferences on issues by stressing different aspects of those
issues (567). For example, by manipulating how Ku Klux Klan rallies were covered, with one
story highlighting the rally as a matter of free speech and one emphasizing the potential for
public disorder and violence, Nelson et al. (1997) observed significant differences in
respondent’s tolerance of the rally. Using Nelson et al.’s (1997) conceptualization of framing
effects, each frame used in this study emphasizes different facts about drug-testing laws. The
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fiscal frame emphasizes how drug-testing laws have failed in their goal to lower government
spending while the legal frame emphasizes how several state drug-testing laws have been found
unconstitutional.
Embedded within these stories are one of the following racial cues: an explicit cue (minority
applicants), a marginal implicit racial cue (inner- city applicants), a non-marginal implicit racial
cue (poor applicants), or no racial cue (applicants). By employing two frames that appeal to
traditional conservative ideology, reducing government spending and preserving personal liberty,
I will determine if introducing a racial component to these conditions influences conservative
preferences.
By conducting my study using a relatively new type of policy—drug testing for welfare
benefits—I will help resolve this debate. Past studies that have found that White opposition to
race-conscious policies is chiefly due to ideology have used policies that conservatives are
already predisposed to oppose. By measuring opinions toward drug-testing for welfare, a policy
that conservatives are predisposed to support, accompanied by multiple conditions, I will
examine how conservatives respond to these different framing techniques. Furthermore, while
Cassese et al. (2015) and Feldman and Huddy (2005) discovered variance in opinion when socioeconomic status was referenced, my study assumes that the policy targets are low-income since
they are applying to receive welfare assistance.
There is reason to believe that Blacks respond differently to implicit racial messages
depending on to whom the message refers (White 2007). Non-marginal implicit appeals, which
refer to the Black community broadly, and marginal implicit appeals, which refer to particular
segments of the Black community, may produce different reactions among Black respondents.
Marginal implicit messages invoke images of "undeserving" elements of society, such as
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criminals and drug users. By referring to such populations, marginal implicit messages may
encourage Black respondents to disregard feelings of linked fate and oppose welfare policies in
the overall Black community (White 2007). Given this, I expect that Blacks randomly assigned
to the non-marginal implicit racial cues will support drug-testing for welfare policy at lower rates
than those assigned to the marginal implicit racial cues.
Moreover, I expect that Black subjects assigned to the legal frame will be more likely to
oppose drug-testing laws than those assigned to the fiscal frame. The Black community has had a
long and well-documented history (and present) of having their legal rights violated by the
American government and law. In the face of institutionalized racism, the Black community is
highly cognizant of violations of the civil rights and liberties of Black people in America.
[Table 1 about here]
As for conservative respondents, I expect conservatives exposed to marginal and nonmarginal implicit racial cues to be more likely to support drug-testing laws. Moreover, I expect
that conservative subjects will be more likely to support drug-testing laws when exposed to the
legal frame. Conservatives, and at times liberals, have shown historical willingness to
consciously deny legal rights to welfare recipients.40
Research Design
Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowd-sourcing tools were used to administer the
survey. Amazon's Mechanical Turk allows requesters to post human-intelligence tasks, or HITs,
for workers to complete for compensation. In recent years, this has become an increasingly
popular method of survey implementation. While MTurk users are not a perfect representation of

40

I discuss some examples of this in the introductory chapter.
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the larger US population, it is generally more diverse than the populations often used for surveys,
such as college students and participants recruited from Internet message boards (Dupuis et al.
2019). Moreover, MTurk respondents are of higher quality in some cases than university
respondents or Internet message boards (Dupuis et al. 2019). MTurk respondents rate better than
college students and Internet message board respondents on measures of quality control and
question failure and rate higher than Internet message board respondents and almost as high as
the former college students on survey completion rates (Dupuis et al. 2019; Paolacci et al. 2010).
The experimental treatments are preceded on the survey by questions about the respondents,
including questions about their age, race, gender, income, education level, marital status,
employment status, and whether they have children. The pre-experiment questionnaire also
includes a news consumption battery, a social media use battery, a seven-point ideology scale,
and a party identification self-placement scale,41 as well as select thermometer ratings and
measures of general welfare policy preferences, out-group resentment, in-group identification,
and racial resentment. In addition to the traditional racial resentment scale, the survey includes a
four-item Fear, (acknowledgment of) Institutional Racism, and Empathy (FIRE) battery
constructed by DeSante and Smith (2020). I include this item and the racial resentment scale to
test the scale's relative predictive power of the respondent's preferences toward drug-testing for
welfare policies.
After completing the pre-experiment questionnaire, respondents are randomly presented with
a short, fabricated news story regarding drug-testing for welfare policies or a control weather
forecast. The drug-testing news story has either a government spending or a personal liberty

41

See appendix for full batteries.
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frame with one of the following racial cues: a non-marginal implicit cue, a marginal implicit cue,
an explicit cue, or no racial cue.42 Post-experiment survey questions measure respondent support
for state drug-testing for welfare policies, whether respondents believe people who use drugs
“deserve” government assistance, opinions of the welfare mother stereotype, welfare recipient’s
moral values compared to other Americans, and whether it is a lack of effort or lack of jobs that
make people poor.
I conduct ordered-logistic regressions to determine which, if any, of the news article
experimental conditions significantly alter support for drug-testing policies. I conduct separate
analyses for all respondents, conservative respondents, and Black respondents. Moreover, I
estimate two models that analyze conservative subjects separately, including one using the
traditional Kinder and Sanders (1986) racial resentment scale and one with DeSante and Smith's
(2020) FIRE battery to determine which has more explanatory power as measured by the model's
respective r-squared values.
Controls in the analysis include gender, age, education level, family income, employment
status, marital status, party identification, attention to news, how often they consume news
weekly, a measure of the importance of equality (We'd be better off if we worried less about
equality) feelings toward the poor (poor thermometer ratings), out-group resentment
(Black/White thermometer ratings) and in-group identification (Do you think that what generally
happens to Black/White people in this country will have something to do with what happens in
your life?).43 Finally, I estimate the predicted probability that conservative and Black
respondents will strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, somewhat support, and strongly support

42

See appendix for full news stories.
Measures of out-group resentment, in-group identification, and feelings toward the poor come from White (2007).
White (2007) also includes a similar measure of the importance equality.
43
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drug-testing laws under each experimental treatment with all other variables of the model held at
their means.
[Tables 2, 3, & 4 about here]
Description of Data
Five hundred and ninety-six respondents responded to the survey on MTurk in early March
2021. Qualifications for participation include that: respondents be at least 18 years old, be
located in the United States, and had an 80% or higher approval rate on previous tasks.
Respondents were paid $1.25 for their participation. As shown in Table 1, 30.49% of subjects
report that they somewhat support drug-testing laws, followed by 27.14% strongly supporting,
24.29% strongly opposing, and 18.09% somewhat opposing drug-testing policies. To
evaluate the findings' external validity, it is helpful to compare the survey population's
demographics to that of the country at large.
Black respondents are somewhat under-represented in the sample compared to national
numbers. According to 2019 Census data, the US is about 13% Black and 76% White while the
Black subjects account for just over 11% and Whites nearly 73% of survey respondents.44 The
proportion of survey respondents who are female is higher than the proportion in the national
population, with 62.25% of respondents being female compared to 50.8% nationally according to
2019 Census data—see Table 3. Within racial groups, nearly 31% of Black subjects are male and

44

According to Census data from 2019, the United States is 19% Hispanic/Latino, 6% Asian, 3% two or more races
<.5% American Indian/Alaskan Native and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander. Comparatively, the survey population
is 1.34% Hispanic/Latino, 8.89% Asian, 4.19% two or more races, .5% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 0%
American Indian/Alaska Native.
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69% are female, while around 39% of White subjects are male and nearly 61% female as shown
in Table 4.
[Tables 5-7 about here]
Since I am also interested in how different framing techniques and racial cues influence
conservative respondents, it is useful to discuss how nationally representative the survey
population is in terms of ideology and party identification. According to 2017 data from the Pew
Research Center, the US is 33% Democrat, 26% Republican, and 37% Independent.45 Table 5
shows that Democrats account for about 50% of survey respondents—nearly 21% identified
themselves as Independents and 29% Republican. In 2019 Gallup found that 37% of Americans
consider themselves conservative, 35% moderates, and 24% liberal. Shown in Table 6, 53.94%
of survey subjects identify as liberal, 13% as moderate, and 33.05% as conservative. In short,
liberals are over-represented while moderates are under-represented in the sample population.46
Two attention check questions are included in the survey. The first asks respondents to select
a specific response to show that they actively participated in the survey. Nearly 99% of
respondents correctly answer this question. Respondents who fail to answer the first attention
check are removed from the analysis. As Table 7 shows, the second attention check question
asked respondents what newspaper the news article they read was from—69.68% of respondents
answered correctly.
[Figure 1 about here]

45

A Gallup poll from early February 2021 found similar results—32% Democrat, 26% Republican, and 41%
Independent.
46
I can also compare the survey population to the national median age and education levels. Compared to the
national median age, 38.2 according to 2018 Census data, survey respondents' median age is similar at 38.2. About
32% of Americans 25 years or older have a bachelor’s degree compared to nearly 51% of survey subjects (Census
2019). See appendix for tables and graphs on education and age.
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I analyze the treatment group means for the dependent variable, support for drug-testing laws,
for all respondents, conservative respondents, and Black respondents which can be seen
graphically in Figure 1. Among all subjects and conservatives, the control treatment group has
the highest mean for drug-testing support—2.89 and 3.5 respectively. Additionally, the fiscal
frame with no racial cue group has the lowest mean for all respondents at 2.43 while, among
conservatives, the legal frame with explicit racial cue experimental condition has the lowest
mean of support at 2.93. Meanwhile, the legal frame with the marginal implicit racial cue
treatment group has the lowest mean, 2, among Black respondents. The highest mean level of
support among Black subjects, with the highest mean at 3.36, is the fiscal frame with explicit
racial cue.47
[Figure 2-Figure 4 about here]
As shown in Figure 2, I also analyze group means for the dependent variable at different
levels of racial resentment, with those levels divided into three categories—low, mid, and high
racial resentment scores. As expected, respondents who scored high on the racial resentment
scale have the highest level of support for drug-testing laws with a mean of 3.13 followed by
subjects in the mid-category with a mean of 2.97, and finally low scorers with a mean of 1.61.
Due to my hypothesis that the effect of the fiscal treatment should be smaller for respondents
who have higher levels of racial resentment, I examine the effect of the fiscal frame on
respondents with low scores and high scores of resentment on drug-testing means.
In Figure 3, we see that highly resentful respondents have significantly higher levels of
support for drug- testing policies compared to respondents who have low racial resentment

47

Graphs of liberal and White respondent means are included in the appendix.
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scores. Among highly resentful subjects, while the differences from the control condition are not
statistically significant, the legal treatment condition produces slightly higher levels of support
for drug-testing when the explicit group is present and when no cue is present, but slightly lower
levels of support when the marginal cue or non-marginal cue are present. Among subjects with
low levels of racial resentment, however, mean support for drug-testing is lower in every legal
frame than it is in the control condition, albeit not to a statistically significant extent. While these
results are consistent with the idea that the legal frames have less effect on more racially
resentful subjects than on less racially resentful ones, the results are not clear cut.
Differences in the effects of the fiscal conditions on less racially resentful and more racially
resentful subjects are less clear. Differences in means between the control condition and the
marginal and non-marginal cue conditions are clearly larger for less resentful subjects than for
more resentful ones, but this is not true for the explicit and no cue conditions, and again, none of
the differences are statistically significant.
I also examine mean racial resentment scores by ideological identifications as shown in
Figure 4. Respondents who self-identify as extreme liberals have the lowest mean racial
resentment scores at 7.37 while those who identify as extremely conservative have the highest
mean at 14.96.
[Table 8 & Table 9 about here]
As shown in Table 8, t-tests examining Black support for drug-testing by experimental
condition find that Black respondents are only significantly different than their White
counterparts on the issue of drug-testing laws in four of the groups. Black respondents are
significantly more likely than White respondents to support drug-testing in the legal frame with
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explicit racial cue condition (p≤.05), the fiscal frame with explicit racial cue (p≤.05), the fiscal
frame with non-marginal racial cue (p≤.10), and the fiscal frame with no racial cue (p≤.10).
Conversely, conservative respondents are significantly different from non-conservative
respondents under every experimental condition as seen in Table 9. Conservatives are
significantly more likely than non-conservative subjects to support drug-testing laws under the
control (p≤.01), the legal frame with explicit racial cue (p≤.05), the legal frame with marginal
racial cue (p≤.01), the legal frame with non-marginal racial cue (p≤.05), the legal frame with no
racial cue (p≤.01), the fiscal frame with explicit racial cue (p≤.01), the fiscal frame with marginal
racial cue (p≤.01), the fiscal frame with non-marginal cue (p≤.01), and the fiscal frame with no
racial cue (p≤.01).
Results
All Respondents
[Figure 5 about here]
As seen in Figure 5, when all other variables are held at their means, exposure to the fiscal
frame with no racial cue results in the highest predicted probability of strongly and somewhat
opposing drug-testing among all respondents, at .22 and .25 respectively, while assignment to the
control group yields the lowest predicted probability of either strongly or somewhat opposing
drug-testing with predicted probabilities of .10 and .16. However, exposure to the control
treatment results in the highest predicted probability of somewhat and strongly supporting drugtesting with predicted probabilities of .41 and .32 with all other variables in the analysis held at
their means. The fiscal frame with no racial cue and the fiscal frame with non-marginal racial
cue results the lowest predicted probabilities of somewhat or strongly supporting such policies.
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Black Respondents
[Table 10 & Figure 6 about here]
To analyze Black respondents’ responses to the experimental conditions estimated an ordered
logistic regression of level of support for drug-testing policies, the results of which be found in
Table 10. I then calculated predicted probabilities of strongly opposing, somewhat opposing,
somewhat supporting, and strongly supporting drug-testing policies under each experimental
condition with all other variables in the model held at their means. The predicted probabilities
are graphically demonstrated in Figure 6. Black respondents assigned to the legal frame with no
cue have the highest predicted probability of strongly or somewhat opposing drug- testing
policies followed by the legal frame and marginal racial cue. These findings do not support my
prediction that Black respondents assigned to this experimental condition would experience
lower levels of support. The two conditions with the lowest predicted probabilities of either
somewhat or strongly opposing drug-testing laws among Black subjects are the fiscal frame with
explicit racial cue condition and the control condition.
The treatment condition that results the highest predicted probability of somewhat supporting
drug-testing among Black respondents is the legal frame with non-marginal implicit racial cue
(.65) followed by the fiscal frame with non-marginal racial cue (.65). This does not support my
prediction that these experimental conditions would cause Black respondents to decrease their
support of the policy due to the nature of the racial appeal. The fiscal frame with explicit racial
cue results in the lowest predicted probability of somewhat supporting drug-testing among
Blacks subjects with a predicted probability of .29. However, the fiscal frame with explicit racial
cue has the highest predicted probability of strongly supporting drug-testing among Black
respondents at .68. Once again, this is the opposite of what was predicted.
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Conservative Respondents
[Figure 7 about here]
Model 2—Racial Resentment
As with the analysis of all respondents and Black respondents, I also calculate predicted
probabilities for conservatives for each experimental condition. As seen in Figure 7, when all
other variables in Model 2 are held at their means, assignment to the legal frame with no racial
cue treatment group results in the lowest probability of conservative’s expressing strong
opposition to drug-testing policies at .02—followed closely by the control group. The treatment
group with the highest predicted probability of strongly opposing drug-testing laws is the fiscal
frame with no racial cue with a probability of .12 followed by the fiscal frame with explicit racial
cue with a predicted probability of .10. This suggests that exposure to an explicit cue
successfully activated social norms of equality and, consequently, caused conservative
respondents to express opposition. Once more, the legal frame with no cue yields the lowest
probability among conservatives, .03, of somewhat opposing drug-testing laws followed by the
control group. Assignment to the fiscal frame with no racial cue results in the highest probability
of somewhat opposing the policy with a predicted probability of .17 followed by the fiscal frame
with explicit cue.
As for support of drug-testing policies, exposure to the legal frame with no cue group yields
the lowest predicted probability, .21, of somewhat supporting drug-testing among conservatives
in Model 2 followed by the control group with a predicted probability of .23. The treatment
group with the highest predicted probability of somewhat supporting drug-testing among
conservatives is the fiscal frame with no cue, .45, followed by the fiscal frame with explicit
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racial cue. Finally, among conservatives in Model 2, the probability of expressing strong support
of drug-testing is highest among those exposed to the legal frame with no cue, .75, and the
lowest probability results from exposure to the fiscal frame with no racial cue with a predicted
probability of .25.
[Figure 8 & 9 about here]
In an ordered-logistic regression of drug-testing support including interactions between the
fiscal frame and ideology, the fiscal frame and the traditional racial resentment scale, the legal
frame and ideology, and the legal frame and the traditional racial resentment scale, none of the
interactions were significant48. Following this regression, I calculated the predicted probability of
strongly opposing, somewhat opposing, somewhat supporting, and strongly supporting drugtesting policies for each level of ideology as well as comparing levels of support between
conservatives who were assigned a news story with the legal frame and those who were assigned
to a news story with the fiscal frame. As evident in Figure 8, while conservatives who were
assigned to fiscal frame treatments did have lower predicted levels of strong support and higher
predicted levels strong opposition to drug-testing than conservative respondents assigned to legal
frames as I had expected, these differences were not significant. As shown in Figure 9, there
were also so significant differences between liberals, moderates, or conservatives assigned to the
fiscal frame.

48

The full multi-variate analysis is included in the appendix of this chapter.

127

Model 3—FIRE Battery
[Figure 10 about here]
Model 3’s includes the FIRE Battery, and predicted probabilities are derived from the
estimated coefficients are illustrated in Figure 8. Using this model, the treatment group with the
lowest predicted probability in the model of strongly opposing and somewhat opposing drugtesting among conservatives is the legal frame with no racial cue, with probabilities of .10 and
.03, respectively, followed closely by the control group. Assignment to the fiscal frame with no
racial cue results in the highest predicted probabilities of .10 and .15, respectively, of strongly or
somewhat supporting drug-testing followed by the fiscal cue with explicit racial cue.
As for support of drug-testing policies, exposure to the legal frame with no racial cue has the
lowest predicted probability of somewhat supporting these laws with a predicted probability of
.20 followed by the control group. Assignment to the fiscal frame with no racial cue and the
fiscal frame with explicit racial cue results in the highest predicted probability of somewhat
supporting drug-testing. The fiscal frame with no cue result in the lowest predicted probability of
strongly supporting drug-testing among conservatives with a predicted probability of .29,
followed closely by the fiscal frame and explicit frame. The groups with the highest predicted
probabilities of expressing strong support are the legal frame with no cue, with a probability of
.76, and the control group with a margin of .72.
Racial Resentment Scale vs. FIRE Battery
Correlations measure the direction and strength of a relationship between two variables. The
correlation between the Kinder and Sanders scale and the DeSante and Smith (2020) scale is
.62—a large and positive correlation that indicates that as one score increases, so does the other.
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I also analyze the relationship between the two by comparing pseudo-R-squared values across
two estimated models, one which included the racial resentment scale, and the other which
included the FIRE battery. A pseudo-R-squared value only has meaning when compared to
another pseudo-R-squared of the same type, identical data, and the same dependent variable. The
racial resentment scale model's pseudo R-squared values is .1339 while the pseudo R-squared
values in the model including the FIRE battery is .1519.
These values vary only slightly, indicating that DeSante and Smith’s argument that the FIRE
scale yields relatively the same, and in some cases slightly more, predictive power as the
traditional racial resentment scale is supported by my analysis. Moreover, as the FIRE battery’s
creators argue, the FIRE questions appear to offer more explanatory power than the traditional
scale due to the nature of the questions. The FIRE battery does not unintentionally measure
conservatism and include questions that capture the different components of racial prejudice.
Discussion
The control treatment group displays the highest mean support for drug-testing policies,
among all respondents while the group of subjects exposed to the fiscal frame with no racial cue
displays the lowest mean. Based on the results of the ordered-logistic regression in Model, I find
that every experimental condition significantly lowers the odds of support for drug-testing laws
among all respondents except for the legal frame with a non-marginal racial cue. Estimations of
predicted probabilities suggest that assignment to the fiscal frame with no racial cue results the
highest probability of strongly opposing drug-testing among all subjects while the control
treatment group results in the highest predicted probability of strongly supporting drug-testing
laws.
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T-tests comparing mean levels of support for drug-testing policies among White and Black
respondents indicate that there were significant differences between the subgroups in one of the
legal frame conditions. Black subjects report significantly higher levels of support for drugtesting policies than their White counterparts when exposed to the legal frame with explicit racial
cue (p≤.05). All but one of the fiscal frame conditions results in a significant difference between
White and Black survey respondents. Assignment to the fiscal frame with explicit racial cue, the
fiscal frame with non-marginal implicit racial cue, and the fiscal frame with no racial cue all
result in higher levels of support for drug-testing for welfare among Black respondents than
among White respondents.
In an ordered logistic regression analysis of Black subjects, only three of the experimental
conditions significantly affect Black preferences toward drug-testing policies. Random
assignment to the legal frame with marginal implicit cue, the legal frame with no cue, and finally
the fiscal frame with no cue significantly lower support for drug-testing among Black
respondents. Estimations of predicted probabilities show that the legal frame with no racial cue
and the legal frame with marginal implicit racial cue result in the highest probabilities of strongly
or somewhat opposing drug-testing. The fact that the two highest predicted probabilities of
opposing drug-testing laws are both variations of the legal frame condition indicates that my
theory that Black respondent’s preferences would be more influenced by news-stories referring
to legal rights/liberties rather than those that referred to financial variables is supported.
However, the latter result is contrary to my prediction that assignment to marginal implicit cues,
which refer to perceived deviant segments of the Black community, would cause Black
respondents to become more supportive of drug-testing for welfare laws.
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Overall, there is mixed evidence that marginal and non-marginal racial cues have different
effects on Black's preferences. However, the sample size of Black respondents in this study have
contributed to the inconclusive results. According to the results, it does appear that race matters
to Black respondents when it is explicitly referenced but instead of following Mendelberg’s
(2001) theory, Black respondents became more support of drug-testing when assigned to the
fiscal frame with explicit cue.
It is also possible, that among all respondents, that mentions of both welfare recipients and
drug-testing immediately prime racial thinking and that these affects are too strong to be offset
by the frames and cues included in the fabricated news stories. To get a more accurate
understanding of marginal and non-marginal implicit cues, I plan to repeat the study with a larger
number of Black subjects with some alterations. First, I would consider including visual cues to
accompany the cues embedded within the fabricated news stories to reinforce the strength of the
cues as well as included fabricated article titles that reinforce the intended prime. Alternatively,
some subjects could receive racial cues without visual supplements while other received racial
cues that include visual elements. Finally, I would also change the explicit cue from "racial
minorities" to the more direct "Black applicants” and alter the wording of the fabricated newsstories.
Using t-tests comparing conservative and non-conservative survey respondents, I find
significant differences between the subgroups in every experimental condition including the
control condition. Conservatives randomly assigned to the control treatment express significantly
higher levels of support compared their non-conservative counterparts (p≤.01). All but one of the
legal frame conditions result in significantly higher levels of support among conservatives. Only
conservative respondents exposed to the legal frame with no racial cue report significantly lower
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levels of support compared to non-conservative respondents (p≤.01). All of the fiscal frame
experimental conditions result in significantly higher levels of support among conservative
subjects (p≤.01). It is important to note, however, that an ordered-logistic regression including an
interaction between ideology and assignment to a news story with a fiscal frame and an
interaction between assignment to a fiscal frame news story and the traditional racial resentment
scale found no significant differences between liberals, moderates, and conservatives or between
conservatives assigned to news stories including the legal frame and conservative respondents
assigned to a news story with a legal frame49.
Using an ordered-logistic regression that includes the traditional racial resentment scale, I find
the legal frame with non-marginal cue and every fiscal frame experimental condition to
significantly lower the odds of supporting drug-testing laws among conservative respondents.
Estimations of predicted probabilities find that assignment to the fiscal frame with no racial cue
and the control group result in the lowest predicted probabilities of strongly opposing drugtesting laws among conservative respondents. The experimental conditions that have the highest
predicted probabilities of strongly opposing drug-testing are the fiscal frame with no cue and the
fiscal frame with explicit cue. The latter result is consistent with my prediction that exposure to
an explicit racial cue would activate social norms of racial equality and cause conservative
respondents to become more opposed to drug-testing laws.
Finally, assignment to the legal frame with no cue results in the highest predicted probability
of strongly supporting drug-testing while the fiscal frame with no cue has the lowest. These
findings support my prediction that conservatives would be more likely to express support for

49

A table with these models can be found in this chapter’s appendix.
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laws that require drug-testing for welfare when assigned to the legal cue rather than the fiscal cue
due to the general willingness of conservatives, and other Americans, to limit the legal rights of
welfare recipients. Moreover, while the evidence is not always statistically significant, the results
are consistent with the idea that priming racial considerations reduces the effects of the fiscal
cue. When racial attitudes are primed, the fiscal cue is less effective in driving opposition to the
policy. This suggests that racial attitudes do indeed affect preferences regarding drug- testing
laws, and not only because the measure of those attitudes may also tap race-neutral conservatism.
Among the most racially conservative subjects, a cue that should prime racially neutral
conservative attitudes only does so to a relatively small extent.
Model 3, which includes the FIRE battery instead of the traditional racial resentment scale,
produces slightly different findings on the effect of the experimental treatments on
conservative’s preferences. Unlike Model 2, Model 3 finds that assignment to the legal frame
with explicit racial cue has a significant and negative relationship to conservatives’ support of
drug-testing, significant at the p≤.10 level, and the fiscal frame with marginal cue became
insignificant. However, the legal frame with non-marginal cue, the fiscal frame with explicit
racial cue, the fiscal frame with non-marginal cue, and the fiscal frame with no cue remain
significant and lower the odds of support.
Estimates of predicted probabilities following the ordered-logistics regression show that the
experimental condition resulting with the lowest predicted probability of strongly opposing drugtesting policies among conservatives is the legal frame with no racial cue, while conservatives
assigned to the fiscal frame with no cue have the highest probability of expressing strong
opposition. The same experimental condition, the fiscal frame with no cue, results in the lowest
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predicted probability of strongly supporting the policy. The highest probability of support among
conservatives results from assignment to the legal frame with no cue.
Ultimately, there is mixed evidence on the question of whether it is primarily conservative
principles or racial prejudice that drives conservative support of drug-testing for welfare policies.
Three of the four experimental conditions that included implicit racial cues significantly lowered
the odds of support of drug-testing among conservative respondents in a model includes the
traditional racial resentment scale while two of the four conditions including implicit cues in the
model including the FIRE battery significantly reduced support for drug- testing among
conservative subjects.
Theoretically, if feelings of racial prejudice drive conservatives’ preferences regarding
welfare policy, exposure to either of the implicit racial cues, marginal or non-marginal, should
have caused conservative respondents to become significantly more supportive of the policy, but
this did not occur. However, in a comparison of mean levels of support for drug-testing laws
between subjects displaying low, moderate, and high scores on the racial resentment scale, I find
that respondents who scored high on the racial resentment scale have the highest levels of
support. Moreover, when comparing the mean level of support between those displaying low and
high levels of racial resentment, I find that high scorers report significantly higher levels of
support for drug-testing under every experimental condition including the control treatment.
According to critics of the traditional racial resentment scale, however, this could be explained
by the conservative component of the measurement.
Yet, Figure 10 shows a comparison of mean support for drug-testing policies across levels of
agreement with the statement that 'Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations,’— one
of the questions in the FIRE battery which is found to be significant in Model 3. The figure
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shows respondents who strongly or somewhat agree with the statement report significantly
higher levels of support for drug-testing policies than those who strongly or somewhat disagree
with the statement. According to the results of Model 3, agreeing with this statement in this FIRE
battery question significantly increases the odds of supporting drug-testing. Regarding the
second question within the FIRE battery that is significant in Model 3, 'I am fearful of people of
other races.' I find that respondents who strongly or somewhat agree with this statement report
significantly higher levels of support for drug-testing laws than those who strongly or somewhat
disagree—results are shown in Figure 11. However, according to the results of Model 3,
agreement with the statement in this FIRE battery question significantly reduces the odds of
support for drug-testing policies.
Therefore, there is some evidence that preferences toward drug-testing policies are influenced
by considerations of race. This is particularly important because though the news stories in this
experiment were fabricated, as I have discussed in previously chapters, the use of predominantly
marginal implicit racial messages in real-world news stories of US welfare policy is frequent. I
expect that this is certainly the case in news coverage of drug-testing for welfare policies, yet
another example of a modern iteration of the American tradition to exert control over
‘underserving’ recipients who supposedly exhibit amoral behavior. I intend to conduct an
examination of the media framing of drug-testing at the state-level in a future project.
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Table 1: Hypotheses
Experimental Condition52
Fiscal Frame/Explicit Cue
Fiscal Frame/Marginal Cue
Fiscal Frame/Non-Marginal Cue

Fiscal Frame/No Cue
Legal/Explicit Cue
Legal/Marginal Cue
Legal/Non-Marginal Cue
Legal/No Cue

Black Respondents
Decrease support
Increase support
Decrease support
Decrease support
Decrease support
Increase support
Decrease support
Decrease support

Conservative Respondents
Decrease support
Increase support
Increase support
Decrease support
Decrease support
Increase support
Increase support
Decrease support
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Table 2: Racial Demographics of Survey Respondents
Race
White
Black
Asian
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
American Indian/Alaska Native
Hispanic/Latino
Two or More Races
Other
Total

Frequency
433
(72.65%)
71
(11.09%)
53
(8.89%
3
(.5%)
0
(0%)
8
(1.34%)
25
(4.19%)
3
(.5%)
596

Table 3: Racial and Gender Demographics of Survey Respondents
White
169
(39.12%)
263
(60.88%)
432

Male
Female
Total

Black
22
(30.99%)
49
(69.01%)
71

Total
191
(37.97%)
312
(62.03%)
503

Table 4: Gender Demographics of Survey Respondents
Gender
Male
Female
Total

Frequency
225
(37.75%)
371
(62.25%)
596
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Table 5: Party Identification of Survey Respondents
Party Identification
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Total

Frequency
292
(50.09%)
120
(20.58%)
171
(29.33%)
583

Table 6: Ideological Placements of Survey Respondents
Ideology
Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Moderate
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Extremely Conservative
Total

Frequency
93
(15.58%)
154
(25.80%)
75
(12.56%)
78
(13.07%)
58
(9.72%)
93
(15.58%)
46
(7.71%)
597

Table 7: Survey Attention Check Results
What newspaper is the
article above from?
Washington Post
New York Times
*The Oklahoman
Total

Frequency
96
(16.08%)
85
(14.24%)
416
(69.68%)
597
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Figure 1: Mean Support for Drug-Testing Policies by Treatment Group (All
Respondents,Black Respondents, and Conservative Respondents )

Lower mean values indicate greater opposition while higher mean values
indicate greatersupport.
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Figure 2: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Level of Racial Resentment

Lower mean values indicate greater opposition while higher mean values
indicate greater support.
Figure 3: Mean Support for Drug-Testing for Low and High Levels of
Racial Resentment by Experimental Condition

Lower mean values indicate greater opposition while higher mean values indicate
greater support.
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Figure 4: Mean Racial Resentment Score by Ideology
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Table 8: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Experimental Condition and
Race
Control

Legal Frame

Fiscal Frame

Explicit

Marginal

NonMarginal

No Cue

Explicit

Marginal

Nonmarginal

No Cue

White

2.85
(.16)

2.28
(.16)

2.60
(.16)

2.66
(.17)

2.48
(.20)

2.51
(.16)

2.38
(.18)

2.49
(.18)

2.41
(.15)

Black

3.2
(.25)

3.33
(.33)

2
(.58)

2.8
(.36)

2.8
(.49)

3.36
(.28)

2.89
(.35)

3
(.30)

3.2
(.37)

PValue

.16

.02**

.81

.36

.29

.02**

.12

.09*

.06*

Results are one-tailed T-tests. Standard errors shown in parentheses.

Table 9: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Experimental Condition and
Ideology
Control

Legal Frame

Fiscal Frame

Explicit

Marginal

NonMarginal

No Cue

Explicit

Marginal

Nonmarginal

No Cue

NonConservative
Conservatives

2.60
(.15)

2.33
(.15)

2.24
(.17)

2.51
(.18)

2.32
(.18)

2.41
(.18)

2.20
(.16)

2.30
(.16)

2.18
(.17)

3.5
(.20)

2.93
(.29)

3.13
(.20)

3.05
(.23)

2.26
(.20)

3.03
(.19)

3.14
(.21)

3.23
(.18)

3
(.19)

PValue

.00***

.04**

.00***

.04**

.00***

.01***

.00***

.00***

.00***

Results are one-tailed T-tests. Standard errors shown in parentheses.
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Table 10: Regression Analyses: Support for Drug-Testing Policies

Angry Racism

--

Model 251
.27
(.24)
.31
(.25)
.21*
(.18)
1.17
(1.13)
.17***
(.14)
.25*
(.21)
.25*
(.20)
.13***
(.11)
1.11**
(.06)
--

Race Problems

--

--

White Advantage

--

--

Race Fear

--

--

.86
(.15)
.97***
(.01)
1.08
(.08)
.94***
(.02)
1.17
(.27)
1.23
(.29)
1.70**

.92
(.35)
.99
(.02)
1.08
(.19)
.92
(.05)
2.59*
(1.45)
1.94
(1.19)
1.58

Legal Frame/Explicit
Cue
Legal Frame/Marginal
Cue
Legal Frame/NonMarginal Cue
Legal Frame/No Cue
Fiscal Frame/Explicit
Cue
Fiscal Frame/Marginal
Cue
Fiscal Frame/NonMarginal Cue
Fiscal Frame/No Cue
RR Scale

Gender
Age
Education
Family Income
Employment Status
Marital Status
Children

Model 150
.58*
(.19)
.48**
(.16)
.65
(.23)
.55*
(.20)
.56*
(.19)
.50**
(.17)
.42***
(.14)
.40***
(.14)
--

Model 352
.19*
(.18)
.30
(.25)
.20*
(.18)
1.23
(1.18)
.16**
(.13)
.34
(.30)
.22*
(.18)
.16***
(.13)
--

Model 453
.40
(.51)
.05*
(.08)
.20
(.22)
.04**
(.05)
2.02
(2.53)
.29
(.31)
.21
(.21)
.09***
(.13)
--

.74
(.14)
1.37*
(.23)
1.29
(.23)
.64**
(.13)
.68
(.27)
.98
(.02)
1.13
(.21)
.98
(.05)
3.41*
(1.97)
2.56
(1.64)
1.46

----.71
(.62)
1.01
(.05)
.62
(.25)
1.04
(.10)
1.99
(2.47)
2.10
(2.25)
1.08

50

All respondents included in model.
Conservative respondents and Kinder and Sanders traditional RR scale.
52
Conservative respondents and DeSante and Smith FIRE battery.
53
Black respondents included in model.
51
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Black Thermometer

(.38)
.97
(.12)
1.30***
(.08)
.96
(.04)
.93
(.12)
1.76***
(.13)
1.00
(.004)
--

White Thermometer

--

White Happens

--

Black Happens

--

Party Identification
Ideology
Week News
Attention News
Worry Equality
Poor Thermometer

(.83)
.97
(.26)
2.34***
(.65)
.97
(.10)
.93
(.27)
1.17
(.20)
1.01
(.01)
.99
(.01)
--

(.82)
1.03
(.29)
3.00***
(.91)
1.01
(.11)
.83
(.26)
1.19
(.20)
1.01
(.01)
.99
(.01)
--

1.37
(.33)
--

1.43
(.36)
--

(1.07)
.97
(.44)
1.62**
(.34)
.87
(.14)
10.25***
(6.44)
1.95*
(.74)
1.04**
(.02)

1.01
(.02)
--

.37
(.23)
Cut 1
-1.08
4.47
4.28
4.86
(.72)
(2.59)
(2.73)
(4.02)
Cut 2
.08
5.53
5.38
6.78
(.71)
(2.60)
(2.74)
(4.10)
Cut 3
1.84
7.48
7.42
9.90
(.72)
(2.64)
(2.77)
(4.23)
Order-logistic Regressions. Results are odds ratios. Standard errors shown in parentheses. Model
1 N=572 Model 2/3 N=152 Model 4 N=67. Significance levels:***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
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Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Each Category of Support for Drug-Testing by Frame
(Conservative Respondents)
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Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Each Category of Support for Drug-Testing by Frame
and Ideology
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Figure 10: Predicted Probability of Each Category of Support for Drug-Testing by
Treatment Group, Model 3—FIRE Battery (Conservative Respondents)
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Figure 11: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Levels of Agreement on FIRE Battery
Question: “Racial Problems in the US Are Rare, Isolated Situations.’
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Figure 12: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Levels of Agreement on FIRE Battery
Questions: ‘I Am Fearful of People of Other Races.’
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Appendix B
Table 11: Support for Hypotheses (Black Respondents)

Table 12: Support for Hypotheses (Conservative Respondents)
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Figure 13: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Treatment Group (White Respondents)

Figure 14: Mean Support for Drug-Testing by Treatment Group (Liberal Respondents)
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Figure 15: Legal Frame and Explicit Racial Cue

Figure 16: Legal Frame and Marginal Implicit Racial Cue
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Figure 17: Legal Frame with Non-Marginal Implicit Racial Cue

Figure 18: Legal Frame with No Racial Cue
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Figure 19: Fiscal Frame with Explicit Racial Cue

Figure 20: Fiscal Frame with Marginal Implicit Racial Cue
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Figure 21: Fiscal Frame with Non-Marginal Implicit Racial Cue

Figure 22: Fiscal Frame with No Racial Cue
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Figure 23: Control
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Table 13: Survey Education Levels

Figure 24: Survey Age Distribution
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Table 15: Regression Analyses: Support for Drug-Testing Policies with Interactions
Variable
Fiscal Frame
Fiscal Frame x Moderates
Fiscal Frame x
Conservatives
Fiscal Frame x RR Scale
Legal Frame
Legal Frame x Moderates
Legal Frame x
Conservatives
Legal Frame x RR Scale
Moderates
Conservatives
RR Scale
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Employment
Marital Status
Children
Party Identification
Weekly News
Consumption
Attention to News
Worry Equality

Odds Ratio
.29
(.25)
.63
(71)
.31
(.28)
1.06
(.09)
.29
(.25)
.85
(.96)
.24
(.22)
1.11
(.10)
1.55
(1.61)
4.68*
(4.02)
1.11
(.09)
.95
(.20)
.97***
(.01)
1.14
(.10)
.94**
(.03)
1.01
(.27)
1.15
(.33)
1.74**
(.46)
.97
(.15)
.93
(.05)
.92
(.14)
1.35***
(.14)
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Poor Thermometer

.99
(.01)
Black Thermometer
1.00
(.01)
White Happens
1.69***
(.23)
Cut 1
.27
(1.18)
Cut 2
1.56
(1.18)
Cut 3
3.35
(1.20)
Ordered-logistic Regressions. Results are odds ratios. Standard errors shown in parentheses.
Liberals serve as the reference category. N=389. Significance levels:***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10.
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Conclusion
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In the introductory chapter, I described the long-standing historical association between
negative racial and gendered stereotypes and on the development of social welfare policies in the
United States. The effects of these stereotypes remain strong in modern welfare policy
development such as the 1996 welfare reforms and the 2010’s drug-testing for welfare policies.
Despite previous studies on public opinion of the 1996 welfare reforms, my examination of
ANES panel data in 1994 and 1996 contributions to the literature by examining the intersection
of race and gender as well as how preferences changed over time. Based on White’s (2007)
experimental study, I predicted that Black panel respondents would respond to the marginal
nature of the racial stereotypes prevalent during the reform debates by becoming less supportive
of welfare spending, colder toward welfare recipients, and more supportive of both the child cap
and two-year limit policies. However, my analysis found that Black respondents’ welfare
spending preferences, welfare recipient thermometer ratings, and support for the time limit
reform remained relatively stable from 1994 to 1996.
Like their White counterparts, most Black women and Black men already supported the twoyear time limit reform in 1994. However, White women and White men were significantly more
likely to support the time limit than their Black counterparts in both years in the analysis. No
subpopulation experienced significant shifts from 1994 to 1996. This has several possible
explanations. For one, it could be that public opinion was in substantial alignment with the
rhetoric of political elites prior to the welfare reform debate given the widespread use and
acceptance of the racist, sexist, and classist stereotypes long before the early 1990s. Another
possible explanation is that the news has only modest effects on public opinion, at least when it
comes to welfare reform, or that for news coverage to have more substantial effects, respondents
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would have had to be exposed to news coverage that frequently utilized negative stereotypes for
a longer period of time.
As for support of the child cap policy, I find that in 1994 most Black men, White women, and
White men expressed support for the reform. The only subgroup in which a majority expressed
opposition to the child cap policy in 1994 was Black women. While White women, White men,
and Black men did not experience significant changes in their opinion on the child cap reform
from 1994 to 1996, Black women went from 60% opposed to the policy in 1994 to a little over
51% in support of the cap in 1996
Despite the challenge of challenge of using data from 1994 and 1996 to analyze the effect of
marginal and non-marginal racial appeals on the preferences of Black respondents, I found some
evidence to support my predictions. The fact that Black women were the only subgroup to
undergo such a change from 1994 to 1996 suggests that my hypothesis that the marginal nature
of the welfare queen stereotype—which emphasized the unworthiness of Black mothers to
receive public assistance—caused Black women to reject feelings of linked fate and become
more supportive of the child cap—is supported. Moreover, while I do not find a relationship
between news consumption and welfare preferences, the fact that Black women became
significantly more supportive of the child cap, but not the two-year limit, suggests that this
change may have been caused by something other than party identification and might be related
to the fact that the development of the child cap policy heavily relied on intersectional
stereotypes.
Modern efforts on behalf of American states to enact legislation requiring applicants for
public assistance undergo drug-tests as a condition of eligibility are a continuation of historical
trends of governmental efforts both to control perceived deviant behavior of the poor and to
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restrict access to public benefits. These proposals and laws have not been the subject of in-depth
analysis other than one study by Ledford (2018). The goal of Chapter 2 was to determine what
factors significantly influenced the diffusion of drug-testing for welfare laws across US states
from 2009 to 2018.
More specifically, I examined whether racial factors such as the percentage of Blacks in a
state’s population, the proportion of Blacks receiving TANF in a state, and state level racial
resentment estimates had a substantive effect on the likelihood of state’s adopting or proposing
laws that require applicants for welfare pass to drug tests. While neither the percentage of Blacks
in a state’s population or the percentage of residents receiving TANF significantly influence the
rate of drug-testing law adoptions and proposals, states with higher state-level racial resentment
estimates are significantly more likely to propose drug-testing laws. For every one standard
deviation increase in racial resentment scores, the hazard ratio of proposal increased by a factor
of 2.34 in Model 1 and 2.17 in Model 2 (p≤.01). This suggests that race, and racist
perceptions of welfare recipients and drug-users, still significantly influence welfare
policymaking at the state level in the case of drug-testing for welfare policies.
The experimental survey in Chapter 3 addressed two fundamental questions within public
opinion scholarship. First, it examined the effect of different kinds of implicit racial cues as first
proposed by White (2007) by using non-marginal and marginal racial cues in a fabricated news
story about drug-testing for welfare laws. Second, it analyzed whether racial prejudice or
conservative principles are more likely to motivate conservative preferences on welfare policies.
This was accomplished using a combination of racial cues and two unique framing
techniques that focus on two principles traditionally associated with conservatism—the
protection of civil liberties and the Constitution and fiscal conservatism. Finally, the chapter
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examined the relative predictive ability of the traditional racial resentment scale first employed
by Kinder and Sanders (1986) compared to the new Fear (acknowledgement of) Institutional
Racism, and Racial Empathy (FIRE) battery created by DeSante and Smith (2020).
I found inconclusive evidence regarding whether different types of implicit racial cues had a
significant effect on Black preferences. According to White (2007), assignment to marginal
implicit racial cues should increase support for drug-testing laws. However, the legal frame with
marginal racial cue news story significantly decreased the odds of supporting drug-testing
policies. In fact, Black subjects assigned to this news story had the second highest predicted
probability of somewhat or strongly opposing drug-testing welfare applicants. Despite this, it
should be noted that the sample size of Black respondents in the study somewhat hinders the
analysis.
Contrary to what was predicted, I found evidence that supports the theory that feelings of
racial resentment do not drive conservative welfare preferences. Both the fiscal and legal frames
with marginal and non-marginal implicit cues significantly lowered the odds of support among
conservative respondents. While the traditional racial resentment scale significantly increased the
odds of support at the p≤.01 level, only one question in the FIRE battery significantly increased
conservative’s support and it only was only marginally significant (p≤.10). Because DeSante and
Smith (2020) argue that the FIRE battery avoids the criticized entanglement with conservative
principles of the traditional racial resentment scale, this may suggest that the latter is, in fact,
capturing conservative ideology and not racial prejudice. The FIRE battery may not
inadvertently capture conservative principles as the Kinder and Sanders scale does, but it does
contain direct references to racism which might violate norms of social equality and cause
respondents to answer untruthfully.
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I also intend to continue my work in public opinion by concentrating on the importance of
intersectionality. I can do so in a variety of ways. I could adapt my experimental survey and add
a gender dimension through the use of visual cues alongside an embedded racial cue. I can also
use the interesting findings in Chapter 3 regarding the effect of opioid use and other drug use on
public perception of welfare applicants by asking respondents if opioid users or drug users with
varying races and genders deserve welfare benefits.
My future work on welfare policy will focus on the various stages of drug-testing policy. I
have already examined the diffusion of these laws and proposals but intend to track these bills
through implementation. Though I have already studied the diffusion of these policies across
states, some of these laws are more punitive than others. I am interested in what causes some
states to adopt stricter drug-testing laws than others and what the consequences of these laws are
for recipients.
In the same vein, I intend to conduct content analyses of media coverage and legislative
debates of these policies both in states that adopted drug-testing laws and those that saw drugtesting laws proposed. Content analysis would allow me to determine how these policies were
framed in different states as well as if racial messages were utilized. Historically, punitive
welfare policies have been more frequently applied to minority welfare recipients. Is this the case
for drug-testing? In states wherein social workers are responsible for identifying “reasonable
suspicion” of drug use, does race play a role? In other words, which applicants are being drug
tested?
According to recent news reports, former president Donald Trump is working with Newt
Gingrich on an agenda for the 2022 midterms for the Republican party is modeled on the 1994
“Contract with America” (McGraw 2021). Newt Gingrich commented that the goals of the new
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legislative agenda are “[s]chool choice, teaching American history for real, abolishing the ‘1619
Project’, [and] eliminating critical race theory…” (McGraw 2021). The 1994 Contract with
America was the embodiment of the historical racist, sexist, and classist stereotypes that have
dominated American policymaking for centuries. Evidence from an analysis of 1994 and 1996
ANES data on welfare preferences indicates that Black women became more supportive of the
child cap policy—the foundation of which was built on racist, sexist, and classist stereotypes of
Black women—over time.
Moreover, a measure of state racial resentment is a significant factor in the recent diffusion of
the punitive drug-testing for welfare benefits laws that have been proposed in nearly every state
and passed in fifteen. Higher levels of racial resentment result in significantly higher support of
these laws among conservative respondents in an experimental survey. These findings support
the fact that racist, sexist, and classist stereotypes remain strong influences on welfare policy in
the US.
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Appendix C
Figure 1: Mechanical Turk Survey Questions
MTurk Survey

Start of Block: Pre-Experiment

Q178 Verify you are not a robot to proceed.

Q1 What is your sex?
o Male (1)
o Female (2)
o Other (3)

Q62 How important is being a man to your identity?
o Extremely important (1)
o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)

Q65 How important is being a woman to your identity?
o Extremely important (1)
o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)
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Q2 Please indicate your age in years.

Q3 Are you now married, widowed, divorced, separated, or never married?
o Married (1)
o Widowed (2)
o Divorced (3)
o Separated (4)
o Never married (5)

Q4 What is the highest level of education you have completed?
o No High school (1)
o High school graduate (2)
o Some college (3)
o 2-year college degree (4)
o 4-year college degree (5)
o Post-graduate degree (6)

Q5 What is your current employment status?
o Full-time employed (1)
o Part-time employed (2)
o Temporarily laid off (3)
o Unemployed (4)
o Retired (5)
o Disabled (6)
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o Homemaker (7)
o Student (8)
o Other (9)

Q6 Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's household income?
o Less than $30,000 (1)
o $30,000-$39,999 (2)
o $40,000-$49,999 (3)
o $50,000-$59,999 (4)
o $60,000-$69,999 (5)
o $70,000-$79,999 (6)
o $80,000-$89,999 (7)
o $90,000-$99,999 (8)
o $100,000-$119,999 (9)
o $120,000-$149,999 (10)
o $150,000-$199,999 (11)
o $200,000-$249,999 (12)
o $250,000-$349,999 (13)
o $350,000-$499,999 (14)
o $500,000 or more (15)

Q7 Please choose the race(s) that you consider yourself to be a member of.
○White (1)
○Black or African American (2)
○American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
○Asian (4)
○Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
○Hispanic/Latino (7)
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○Other (6)
Q193 Do you think that what happens generally to White people in this country will have
something to do with what happens in your life?
o A lot (1)
o Some (2)
o Not very much (3)
o Not at all (4)

Q194 Do you think that what happens generally to Black people in this country will have
something to do with what happens in your life?
o A lot (1)
o Some (2)
o Not very much (3)
o Not at all (4)

Q141 How important is being Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander to your identity?
o Extremely important (1)
o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)

Q59 How important is being Black or African American to your identity?
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o Extremely important (1)
o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)

Q66 How important is being White to your identity?
o Extremely important (1)
o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)

Q139 How important is being Asian to your identity?
o Extremely important (1)
o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)

Q140 How important is being American Indian or Alaskan Native to your identity?
o Extremely important (1)
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o Very important (2)
o Moderately important (3)
o Slightly important (4)
o Not at all important (5)

Q8 Do you have children?
o Yes (1)
o No (2)

Q150 How close do you feel to your racial group?
o Extremely close (1)
o Very close (2)
o Moderately close (3)
o Slightly close (4)
o Not at all close (5)

Q151 How close do you feel toward Americans who are not in your racial group?
o Extremely close (1)
o Very close (2)
o Moderately close (3)
o Slightly close (4)
o Not at all close (5)
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Q9 During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to the news on the TV,
radio, printed newspaper, or the Internet, not including sports?
o None (1)
o One day (2)
o Two days (3)
o Three days (4)
o Four days (5)
o Five days (6)
o Six days (7)
o Seven days (8)

Q10 We are interested in how people get information about events in the news. Where do you
get most of your information about current news events?
o Newspapers (1)
o Magazines (2)
o Internet (3)
o Books or other printed materials (4)
o TV (5)
o Radio (6)
o Government agencies (7)
o Family (8)
o Friends (9)
o Colleagues (10)
o Other (11)
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Q11 How much attention do you pay to the news about national politics on TV, radio, printed
newspapers, or the Internet?
o A great deal (1)
o A moderate amount (2)
o A little (3)
o None at all (4)

Q12 During a typical week, how many days do you use social media such as Twitter or
Facebook?
o None (1)
o One day (2)
o Two days (3)
o Three days (4)
o Four days (5)
o Five days (6)
o Six days (7)
o Seven days (8)

Q13 Which of the following social networking or social media sites are you a member or regular
user of?
○Facebook (1)
○Instagram (2)
○Twitter (3)
○Reddit (4)
○Other (5)
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Q14 Where would you place yourself on this scale?
o Extremely liberal (1)
o Liberal (2)
o Slightly liberal (3)
o Independent (4)
o Slightly conservative (5)
o Conservative (6)
o Extremely conservative (7)

Q15 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an
Independent, or what?
o Democrat (1)
o Republican (2)
o Independent (3)
o Other (4)

Q149 Do you consider yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
o Strong (1)
o Not very strong (2)
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Q148 Do you consider yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?
o Strong (1)
o Not very strong (2)

Q180 Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or kept about the
same?
o Increased (1)
o Decreased (2)
o Kept about the same (3)

Q191 Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the legalization of marijuana?
o Favor (1)
o Oppose (2)
o Neither favor nor oppose (3)

Q195 Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government trying to reduce the
difference in incomes between the richest and the poorest households?
o Favor (1)
o Oppose (2)
o Neither favor nor oppose (3)
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Q186 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Irish, Italian,
Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should
do the same without any special favors.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q188 To what degree to you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Generations of
slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their
way out of the lower class.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q189 This question is to ensure you are paying attention. Please select "disagree somewhat."
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
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o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q190 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Over the past few
years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q192 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'It's really a matter
of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well
off as Whites.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q205 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'I am angry that
racism exists.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
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o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q206 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Racial problems in
the US are rare, isolated situations.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q207 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'White people in
the US have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q208 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'I am fearful of
people of other races.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
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o Disagree strongly (5)

Q209 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Minorities should
adapt to the customs and traditions of the United States.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q210 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'The will of the
majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)

Q211 To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'We'd be better of
if we worried less about equality.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
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o Disagree strongly (5)

Q196 Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve
the social and economic position of Blacks. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at
point 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks
because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.
Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Q198 Please enter the rating number in the box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and less than
50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much
for that group.
How would you rate: Blacks?

Q199 Please enter the rating number in the box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and less than
50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much
for that group.
How would you rate: Whites?
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Q200 Please enter the rating number in the box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and less than
50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much
for that group.
How would you rate: welfare recipients?

Q201 Please enter the rating number in the box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and less than
50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much
for that group.
How would you rate: poor people?

Q202 Please enter the rating number in the box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and less than
50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much
for that group.
How would you rate: drug addicts?
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Q203 Please enter the rating number in the box. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees
mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and less than
50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much
for that group.
How would you rate: opioid addicts?

Q204 We're going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a
group can be rated. A score of '1' means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend
to be 'hardworking.' A score of '7' means that you think most people in the group are 'lazy'. A
score of '4' means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the
other, and of course, you may choose any number in between.

End of Block: Pre-Experiment

Start of Block: Experiment

[Randomized news-story here]

End of Block: Experiment
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Start of Block: Post-Experiment

Q137 What newspaper was the article above from?
o Washington Post (1)
o New York Times (2)
o The Oklahoman (3)

Q16 To what degree do you support or oppose state laws that require applicants for welfare to
pass drug tests?
o Support strongly (1)
o Support somewhat (2)
o Oppose somewhat (3)
o Oppose strongly (4)

Q17 To what degree do you agree with the following statement? 'Welfare recipients who use
drugs don't deserve government assistance.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)
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Q220 Do you believe that it is a lack of jobs or a lack of effort that makes people poor?
o Lack of jobs (1)
o Lack of effort (2)
o Not sure (3)

Q221 In general, do you think people on welfare have higher, lower, or about the same moral
values as other Americans?
o Higher (1)
o Lower (2)
o About the same (3)

Q222 To what degree do you agree with the following statement? 'Welfare encourages women to
have babies.'
o Agree strongly (1)
o Agree somewhat (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Disagree somewhat (4)
o Disagree strongly (5)
End of Block: Post-Experiment

Start of Block: Random ID

Q233 Here is your Survey Code: ${e://Field/Random%20ID} Paste this value into MTurk
When you have copied this ID, please click the next button to submit your survey. Please keep
this code for your records.
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